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WHAT Is CAESAR'S, WHAT Is Goo's: 
FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY FOR CHURCHES 
LLOYD HITOSHI MA YER* & ZACHARY B. POHLMAN** 
ABSTRACT 
Bob Jones University v. United States is a highly debated Supreme 
Court decision, both regarding whether it was correct and what exactly it 
stands for, and a rarely applied one. Its recognition of a ''fundamental pub-
lic policy doctrine" that could cause an otherwise tax-exempt organization 
to lose its favorable federal tax status remains highly controversial, alt-
hough the Court has shown no inclination to revisit the case, and Congress 
has shown no desire to change the underlying statutes to alter the case's 
result. That lack of action may be in part because the IRS applies the deci-
sion in relatively rare and narrow circumstances. 
The mention of the decision during oral argument in Obergefell v. 
Hodges raised the specter of more vigorous and broader application of the 
doctrine, however. It renewed debate about what public policies other than 
avoiding racial discrimination in education might qualify as fundamental 
and also whether and to what extent the doctrine should apply to churches, 
as opposed to the religious schools involved in the original case. The IRS 
has taken the position that churches are no different than any other tax-
exempt organizations in this context, although it has only denied or re-
voked the tax-exempt status of a handful of churches based on this doc-
trine. 
* Professor, Notre Dame Law School. 
** J.D. candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2021. The authors are very grateful for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts from Stephanie Barclay, Boyd Black, Mark E. 
Chopko, Richard W. Garnett, and participants in the NYU School of Law National Cen-
ter on Philanthropy and the Law Annual Conference and the Notre Dame Faculty Col-
loquium. Copyright© 2021 by Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer and Zachary B. Pohlman. 
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The emergence of the Bob Jones University decision in the Obergefell 
oral argument renders consideration of these issues particularly timely, 
especially in light of developments over the past several decades both with 
respect to the legal status of churches and what arguably could be consid-
ered fundamental policy. This Article therefore explores whether there are 
emerging conflicts between a significant number of churches and what 
could be considered fundamental public policy, not only with respect to 
sexual orientation discrimination but also with respect to sex discrimina-
tion, sanctuary churches, and other areas. Finding that there are several 
current or likely future such conflicts, it then explores whether there are 
philosophical and legal grounds for treating churches differently from 
other tax-exempt organizations for purposes of applying the contrary-to-
fundamental-public-policy doctrine and the related illegality doctrine. 
Drawing on both the longstanding concept of "sphere sovereignty" and 
emerging work in the area of First Amendment institutions, the Article 
concludes that churches should not be subject to the former doctrine, but 
that they still should be subject to loss of their tax benefits if they engage 
in or encourage significant criminal activity. The Article then concludes 
by applying this conclusion to the identified areas of current or likely fu-
ture conflict to demonstrate how the IRS and the courts should apply the 
Bob Jones University decision to churches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Tell us then, what is your opinion? Is it right to pay the 
imperial tax to Caesar or not?" But Jesus, knowing their 
evil intent, said, "You hypocrites, why are you trying to 
trap me? Show me the coin used for paying the tax." They 
brought him a denarius, and he asked them, "Whose 
image is this? And whose inscription?" "Caesar's," they 
replied. Then he said to them, "So give back to Caesar 
what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's."1 
The relationship of churches and governments has a long and 
fraught history, including with respect to taxes.2 Policymakers, 
church leaders, and various commentators have put forward nu-
merous reasons both for and against preferential tax treatment for 
some or all churches.3 And when governments provide such pref-
erential tax treatment, as they often do, the issue then arises of 
what-if any-conditions can and should apply to such treatment. 
More than thirty-five years ago the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Bob Jones University v. United States4 sent shock 
waves through religious congregations even though the case itself 
involved religious schools and not churches.5 This was because the 
case suggested that any organization, even a church, that was ex-: 
empt from federal income tax as a "charity" and so also eligible to 
receive tax deductible charitable contributions, could lose those 
benefits if found to have an activity or purpose that was illegal or 
otherwise "contrary to a fundamental public policy."6 The vague-
ness of the latter phrase, combined with the specter of the Internal 
l. Matthew 22:17-21 (New International Version). 
2. For purposes of this Article, "churches" refers to house of worship of all types, 
including synagogues, mosques, and temples. For a discussion of more specific legal 
definitions, see infra Part IV.D. 
3. See infra Parts III.B. and III.C. 
4. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
5. Id. at 574. 
6. Id. at 591-92. 
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Revenue Service making determinations regarding what consti-
tutes fundamental public policy, only heightened the fear that the 
case could usher in new and intrusive IRS supervision of churches.7 
However, reality did not come to reflect this fear. The IRS has 
sought to strip tax benefits from churches based on Bob Jones Uni-
versity or the doctrine that it established only five times: once re-
lated to one of the parties in Bob Jones University, three times for 
churches involved in illegal criminal activity, and once for an una-
pologetically racist church where the exact reasons for the revoca-
tion are unclear.8 Indeed, the IRS has shown little interest in ex-
panding the application of this case beyond situations involving 
either racial discrimination or significant illegal activity.9 
Bob Jones University nevertheless remains good law, and the fol-
lowing exchange during oral argument in the Obergefell v. Hodges 10 
same-sex marriage case reawakened the concerns of many religious 
organizations and leaders: 
JUSTICE AUTO: Well, in the Bob Jones case, the Court held 
that a college was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it op-
posed interracial marriage or interracial dating. So would 
the same apply to a university or a college if it opposed 
same-sex marriage? 
[SOLICITOR] GENERAL VERRILLI: You know, I-I don't 
think I can answer that question without knowing more 
specifics, but it's certainly going to be an issue. I-I don't 
deny that. I don't deny that, Justice Alito. It is-it is going 
to be an issue.11 
7. See, e.g., William A. Drennan, Bob Jones University v. United States: For Whom Will 
the Bell Toll?, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 588-93 (1985); Joe W. Miller, Note, Applying a 
Public Benefit Requirement to Tax-Exempt Organizations, 49 Mo. L. REV. 353, 366, 368 
(1984). 
8. See infra Part LB. 
9. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
10. 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 
14-556). 
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This point was not lost on the dissenters in that case, who high-
lighted this possibility.12 And it does not take much imagination to 
apply Solicitor General Verrilli's response to churches, many of 
which have strong positions opposing same-sex marriage.13 
So to what extent does Bob Jones University, combined with chang-
ing views of what constitutes fundamental public policy, actually 
threaten the tax benefits enjoyed by churches? Part I of this Article 
considers what the Court actually decided in that case, including 
its (very limited) discussion of how its decision might apply to 
churches. Part I also reviews the few subsequent applications of 
that decision to churches by the IRS and the courts. Part II then 
identifies several existing and likely future conflicts between 
churches and fundamental public policy that the IRS and courts 
have yet to address. The remainder of this Article then explores 
how the IRS and courts should resolve these new conflicts. Part III 
begins this exploration by considering the extent to which churches 
enjoy preferential tax treatment in the United States, the reasons for 
such treatment, and the constitutional ramifications of that treat-
ment, all of which could affect the application of Bob Jones Univer-
sity to churches. Part IV then explores the philosophical and legal 
basis for treating churches differently for tax purposes generally 
and with respect to application of Bob Jones University specifically. 
Finally, Part V pulls these strands together to provide a more com-
plete answer to how Bob Jones University should apply to churches. 
While many other scholars have addressed the issues covered in 
the first four Parts, none have pulled together all of these various 
lines of thought to comprehensively consider how Bob Jones Univer-
sity should apply to churches in the twenty-first century. 
12. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 711 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Laurie Goodstein & 
Adam Liptak, Schools Fear Gay Marriage Ruling Could End Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2015, at Al3. 
13. See, e.g., Benjy Sarlin, O'Rourke says churches against gay marriage should lose tax 
benefits, draws backlash, NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/poli-
tics/2020-election/o-rourke-says-churches-against-gay-marriage-should-lose-tax-
n1065186 [https://perma.cc/U9PX-JF22]. 
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Our conclusion is that churches should be at risk of losing their 
federal tax benefits only if they engage in significant criminal activ-
ities and not if their activities or purposes are only contrary to fun-
damental public policy. The reason for this limitation on the appli-
cation of Bob Jones University is that the tax benefits for churches are 
based not only on a quid pro quo theory-that the societal benefits 
they provide are sufficient to justify those tax benefits-but also on 
a "soft sovereignty" theory that grants them significant autonomy 
from the government, including with respect to taxes, in recogni-
tion of their distinct role in society. The legal bases for this soft sov-
ereignty approach are the First Amendment's Religion Clauses and 
the need for governments generally to avoid both substantially bur-
dening religious exercise and undue entanglement with religious 
institutions. However, given both the continued viability of Bob 
Jones University and other considerations discussed below, this lim-
ited application applies only to churches and not to other religious 
organizations, such as the religious schools in the Bob Jones Univer-
sity case. And since churches are not co-equal sovereigns with the 
government and so are not above the law, in the rare instances 
where it is conclusively shown that a church is engaging in substan-
tial criminal activities that demonstrate a significant criminal pur-
pose, the church should lose the tax benefits it otherwise would en-
joy. In other words, this approach provides a demarcation between 
what in this context belongs to Caesar and what does not that ap-
propriately balances the legal rights of churches with the legal au-
thority of the state. 
I. CHURCHES AND BOB JONES UNIVERSITY 
Numerous commentators have described and analyzed the back-
ground, reasoning, and aftermath of Bob Jones University in great 
detail.14 The purpose of this Article is not to cover that well-trodden 
14. See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 397 (2005); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: 
Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1983); Miriam Galston, Pub-
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ground in detail or the many critiques of the Court's reasoning. Ra-
ther, for purposes of this Article we will accept the case as bind-
ing-a realistic assumption, given that the Supreme Court has 
shown no inclination to revisit it and Congress has shown no inter-
est in revising the applicable statutes to modify or overrule it. We 
will instead focus on the points most salient to the case's potential 
application to churches, including the few actual such applications 
by the IRS and the courts in the wake of that decision. One im-
portant ramification of this assumption relates to the case's appli-
cation to organizations that are religious in the sense that their mis-
sions flow from sincerely held religious beliefs but are not generally 
considered churches, including the schools involved in the case. 
Since the Court squarely rejected a First Amendment free exercise 
of religion argument that such organizations should not be subject 
to the fundamental public policy doctrine as applied in the case,15 
we will only briefly revisit that issue here, even though our analysis 
arguably could extend to such organizations.16 The focus of this Ar-
ticle is therefore to address an issue explicitly left open by the Court 
in Bob Jones University-to what extent the Court's holding should 
apply to churches.17 
lie Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 VA.TAX REV. 291 (1984); Michael Hat-
field et al., Bob Jones University: Defining Violations of Fundamental Public Policy (Nat'l 
Ctr. Philanthropy & L., Topics in Philanthropy no. 6, 2000), 
https://ncpl.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Monograph/Monograph2000Bob-
Jones.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLQ4-B8QL]; David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Let 
Prophets Be (Non)Profits, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2017); Olatunde C. Johnson, The 
Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion, and Congress' Extraordinary 
Acquiescence, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES (William N. Eskridge et al. eds., 
2011); see also Drennan, supra note 7, at 565 n.21 (collecting academic articles written 
about the case as it made its way to the Supreme Court). 
15. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983). 
16. See id. at 604-05; infra notes 345-349 and accompanying text. For an argument that 
religious freedom protections should extend to religious entities that provide services 
to the broader public, such as schools, see generally Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated 
Religious Activity: A Case for Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1341 (2016). 
17. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Case 
Bob Jones University involved two nonprofit, religious, private 
schools with racially discriminatory policies that they based on re-
ligious doctrine.18 From 1975 through at least the time of the deci-
sion in 1983, Bob Jones University permitted African-Americans to 
enroll but had a disciplinary rule prohibiting interracial dating, in-
terracial marriage, and advocacy of such; the University also did 
not admit applicants who were in an interracial marriage or were 
known to engage in such advocacy.19 Goldsboro Christian Schools, 
a K-12 institution, generally accepted only whites as students, alt-
hough it had on occasion accepted children from racially mixed 
marriages in which one of the parents was white.20 
The statutory provisions at issue were the Internal Revenue Code 
sections that usually provide nonprofit schools with tax exemption 
and the ability to receive tax deductible contributions.21 For pur-
poses of this Article, the key legal question before the Court was 
whether Congress intended to include in those provisions a re-
quirement that in order to receive these benefits, an organization 
had to satisfy a common-law standard the Court found applicable 
to charitable trusts: that they "must serve a public purpose and not 
be contrary to established public policy."22 The Court generally an-
swered this question in the affirmative, 23 but left significant uncer-
tainty regarding the exact parameters of this doctrine in at least four 
respects. 
First, the Court subtly shifted its language from "established" 
public policy to "fundamental" public policy, without explaining 
the significance of this change.24 Second, it left unclear whether an 
18. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577. 
19. Id. at 580--81. 
20. Id. at 583. 
21. I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (c)(2), 501(c)(3) (2018). 
22. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586. 
23. Id. at 592. 
24. Compare id. at 586, 591 with id. at 592-93, 595, 596 n.21. 
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organization disqualified itself from these tax benefits by acting 
contrary to such a public policy, having a purpose contrary to such 
public policy, or some combination of the two.25 The Court also left 
unclear what level of activity or priority of purpose would be re-
quired to result in disqualification.26 Third, it stated that such dis-
qualification flowed both from illegality and from being contrary 
to such public policy, without explaining the difference between 
the two.27 Finally, it concluded that the First Amendment's Free Ex-
ercise Clause did not prevent disqualification because the govern-
ment's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education 
was compelling and disqualification was the least restrictive means 
to further that interest.28 However, the Court did not reach whether 
this holding extended to churches: 
We deal here only with religious schools-not with 
churches or other purely religious institutions; here, the 
governmental interest is in denying public support to 
racial discrimination in education. As noted earlier, 
racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a pervasive 
influence on the entire educational process," outweighing 
any public benefit that they might otherwise provide.29 
It therefore left the application of its decision to churches uncertain. 
25. See id. at 586-87. 
26. Compare id. at 587 & n.11 (charitable "purposes"), 589 (public "purposes"), 591 & 
n.18 ("purpose"), 592 & n.19 ("purpose"), with id. at 592 ("activity"), 593 n.20 ("activi-
ties"), 596 n.21 ("activities"), 598 ("activities"). 
27. See id. at 591. 
28. See id. at 604. Despite the Court's use of compelling governmental interest and 
least restrictive means language characteristic of strict scrutiny analysis, the Court ap-
pears to have in fact applied a more deferential level of scrutiny, possibly because of 
the decision's tax context. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, 
Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2009); Elliot 
M. Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury after Taxation with Representation of 
Washington, Mueller and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275, 305 (1984). 
29. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.29 (emphasis in original) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,469 (1973)). 
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Many scholars have addressed these areas of uncertainty in de-
tail. 30 Here it is sufficient to note that in the first three areas com-
mentators have taken a broad range of positions, and neither the 
Supreme Court nor the lower courts have done much to provide 
clarity.31 Similarly, the IRS has not done much to develop the con-
cept of "fundamental" public policy.32 In fact, its subsequent appli-
cations of Bob Jones University have been almost entirely limited to 
situations involving criminal activities, racial discrimination relat-
ing to education, or, less commonly, to other contexts where such 
discrimination "can reasonably be expected to aggravate the dis-
parity in the educational, economic, or social levels of [a racial] 
group when compared with society as a whole."33 
However, unlike the courts, the IRS has attempted to resolve the 
latter three areas of uncertainty. First, it has focused on activities as 
evidence of purposes as opposed to considering either activities or 
purposes in isolation.34 More specifically, it has taken the position 
that acts that are illegal or contrary to public policy and that are also 
a substantial part of an organization's activities (taking into account 
the nature of the acts as well as their quantity) demonstrate a dis-
qualifying non-charitable purpose.35 Second, it has taken the posi-
tion that activities can be contrary to fundamental public policy 
even absent violations of any federal, state, or local laws, providing 
30. See, e.g., supra note 14. 
31. See id. 
32. See infra notes 33-34. 
33. IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-10-001 (Mar. 10, 1989); IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,792 
(Aug. 17, 1987). See generally Samuel D. Brunson & David J. Herzig, A Diachronic Ap-
proach to Bob Jones: Religious Tax Exemptions after Obergefell, 92 IND. L.J. 1175, 1189-95 
(2017). 
34. IRS, Activities That are Illegal or Contrary to Public Policy, in EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
FY 1985, at 109-10 (1984), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicj85.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6LSH-XWS6]. 
35. Id.; Jean Wright & Jay H. Rotz, Illegality and Public Policy Considerations, in EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FY 1994, at 2 (1993), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl94.pdf 
[https://perma.ccNFG2-BENE]. 
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the situations in Bob Jones University as examples.36 Relatedly, the 
IRS distinguishes between illegal activity, by which it means activ-
ity in violation of federal, state, or local statutes (usually criminal 
ones),37 and activity contrary to fundamental public policy, for 
which it implicitly includes the modifier "federal," consistent with 
the Supreme Court's focus on federal policy in the Bob Jones Univer-
sity case.38 Third and finally, the IRS has taken the position that 
churches should not be treated differently from any other type of 
organization claiming the tax benefits available to charities: if 
churches engage in "substantial" activities that are illegal or con-
trary to fundamental public policy, then they are disqualified from 
receiving those benefits.39 The question then becomes what activi-
ties of a church might be illegal or contrary to fundamental public 
policy, with racial discrimination (assuming no church-run school) 
not necessarily rising to that level.40 
This last IRS position is not without its critics. For example, 
Professor Jerold Friedland concludes that the above-quoted foot-
note "suggests the Court intended to r.eserve its judgment on both 
the public policy and first amendment issues with respect to ra-
cially discriminatory churches."41 He therefore leaves open the pos-
sibility that the Court might conclude that applying the Bob Jones 
University holding to churches violates the First Amendment. And 
in an analysis written shortly before the Supreme Court's decision, 
Professor Douglas Laycock argued that the First Amendment, and 
36. IRS, supra note 34, at 114; Wright & Rotz, supra note 35, at 3. 
37. See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (violations of local criminal ordinances); IRS, 
supra note 34, at 110-11; Hatfield et al., supra note 14, at 3, 95-100; Wright & Rotz, supra 
note 35, at 8, 10. 
38~ See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593-95; IRS, supra note 34, at 114-15; Wright & 
Rotz, supra note 35, at 3, 9-10. This reading is also consistent with an earlier federal 
district court opinion that anticipated the Bob Jones University decision. See Green v. 
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163-64 (D.D.C. 1971) (focusing on federal public policy). 
39. IRS, supra note 34, at 110, 116-18; see also Wright & Rotz, supra note 35, at 19-20. 
40. See Schachner, supra note 28, at 310. 
41. Jerold A. Friedland, Constitutional Issues in Revoking Religious Tax Exemptions: 
Church of Scientology of California v. Comm'r, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 565,587 (1985). 
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particularly the concept of church autonomy, generally prohibited 
government interference with the internal affairs of churches, in-
cluding interference in the form of revoking the tax-exempt status 
of racially discriminatory churches.42 
We will return to the first three areas of uncertainty in Part II, 
when we discuss current and likely future areas of conflict between 
churches and fundamental public policy. As for the application of 
the Bob Jones University decision to churches generally, we will re-
turn to that unsettled issue in Part IV, after considering the basis for 
the tax benefits provided to churches. Before considering the tax 
treatment of churches more generally, however, it is worth describ-
ing the instances where the IRS has applied Bob Jones University spe-
cifically to churches. 
B. Subsequent Rulings and IRS Actions Involving 
Churches 
The IRS has rarely applied Bob Jones University to churches, per-
haps taking to heart the now forty-year-old admonition of 
Professor Stephen Schwarz that "in this delicate area, the Internal 
Revenue Service would do well to halt at the gates of the church, 
preserving valuable religious and associational rights in the pro-
cess."43 Nevertheless, the IRS has entered those gates while waving 
the Bob Jones University flag a handful of times. 
In Synanon Church v. United States,44 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia noted that, while the religious status of the or-
ganization at issue was in dispute, "[e]ven a bona fide church that 
42. Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 
TEX. L. REV. 259, 261--63 (1982). 
43. Stephen Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Ren-
der unto Caesar, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 50, 91 (1976). 
44. 579 F. Supp. 967 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd 820 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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failed the ... Bob Jones test would not be eligible for tax exemp-
tion."45 It "reluctantly" declined, however, to apply Bob Jones Uni-
versity to resolve the case based on acts and threats of physical vio-
lence by the organization's leaders and members because the 
organization's fraud on the court provided a sufficient basis for rul-
ing in the government's favor.46 
In Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner,47 the U.S. Tax 
Court upheld the revocation of tax-exempt status from the Church 
of Scientology of California based in part on the proven conspiracy 
by church leaders to impede the IRS in violation of federal criminal 
law. These actions, the court concluded, demonstrated the church's 
substantial illegal purpose.48 In doing so, the court rejected the 
church's argument that revocation was not permitted under the 
First Amendment because a less restrictive means-criminal pros-
ecution of the individual offenders-was available to address the 
illegal activities.49 However, on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit did not apply Bob Jones University because it 
affirmed the Tax Court's decision on other grounds.50 
The IRS also revoked the tax-exempt status of the racist World 
Church of the Creator, apparently based on the reasoning the Court 
upheld in Bob Jones University, although the IRS likely made its de-
cision before the Court issued that opinion.51 That organization 
was, however, unable to challenge that revocation in court because 
45. Id. at 971. 
46. Id. at 978-79 (dismissing the case with prejudice because of fraud on the court 
and so not reaching the merits of the government's tax exemption decision). 
47. 83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff d 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). 
48. Id. at 502-09. 
49. Id. at 503, 506-07. 
50. Church of Scientology of Cal., 823 F.2d at 1315. 
51. See Te-Ta-Ma Truth Foundation-Family of Uri, Inc. v. World Church of the Cre-
ator, 297 F.3d 662, 663-64 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Church of the Creator v. Comm'r, 707 
F.2d 491 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
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of a procedural failure, and so the IRS' s substantive position was 
not subject to judicial review.52 
In 1988 the IRS issued a General Counsel Memorandum discuss-
ing the proposed revocation of a church's tax-exempt status be-
cause of how it operated a school.53 Having found that the church 
failed to meet its burden of showing that it operated the school in a 
bona fide nondiscriminatory manner, the IRS further concluded 
that since the church and school were apparently a single legal en-
tity that was both an educational institution and a religious institu-
tion-a characterization the Supreme Court had applied to Bob 
Jones University in its decision-it was appropriate to revoke the 
tax-exempt status of that legal entity (and therefore of the church 
as well as of the school).54 While the Memorandum was redacted to 
conceal the identity of the church and school involved, as required 
by taxpayer privacy laws,55 the church almost certainly was the one 
associated with the Goldsboro Christian Schools involved in the 
Bob Jones University case.56 
Finally, in 2013 the IRS denied an application for recognition of 
exemption under Section 501(c)(3) from a church with polygamy in 
52. Church of the Creator, 707 F .2d at 492-93. 
53. I.RS. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,754 Ouly 7, 1988). 
54. Id.; see also Robert J. Desiderio, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS§ 14.04 
(2018) (stating a church can avoid the application of this Memorandum and so protect 
its own tax-exempt status by making a school that does not meet the requirements for 
exemption a separate legal entity). This position was consistent with the IRS's an-
nounced position prior to the Bob Jones University decision. See Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 
C.B.158. 
55. See I.RC.§ 6103 (2018); Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 
668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming order requiring public disclosure of General Coun-
sel's Memoranda under the Freedom of Information Act subject to redacting tax return 
information protected by I.RC. § 6103). 
56. See Oliver S. Thomas, The Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Arguments 
for Church Tax Exemption and the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 605, 614 
nn.57-58 (1992); Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Revokes Church Tax Exemption for First Time, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1988/ 
12/07/irs-revokes-church-tax-exemption-for-first-time/041f2d82-4706-4a2b-b0e4-
a83e2e8ff963/ [https://perma.cc/Q6C4-T9CT]. 
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its beliefs and practices.57 The IRS based the denial both on the or-
ganization's violation of state criminal law-a jury had found a 
leader of the group guilty of bigamy-and of the federal (presum-
ably fundamental) policy against bigamy.58 
These five instances therefore involved illegal criminal activity in 
three cases, an uncertain basis for revocation in the fourth case, and 
a church's operation of a racially discriminatory school (and indeed 
a school that almost certainly was one of the subjects of the Bob Jones 
University decision) in the fifth case. Therefore, despite the IRS' s 
general statements that Bob Jones University applies to churches,59 in 
practice the IRS has applied that case to churches only in very lim-
ited circumstances. It is unclear, however, whether this reluctance 
flows from a general sense of caution in this fraught area, a more 
specific concern about avoiding any appearance of selectively tar-
geting minority religious faiths, or a lack of instances where the IRS 
knows there is a plausible case that a church is in fact acting con-
trary to fundamental public policy. 
II. CHURCHES AND FUNDAMENTAL PlIBLIC POLICY 
This Part explores whether there are any current or likely future 
conflicts between churches and fundamental public policy-even if 
the IRS has so far not chosen to act with respect to them-that 
would require considering if and how Bob Jones University applies 
to churches. While the IRS and the courts have also applied the il-
legality aspect of the Bob Jones University holding to churches, our 
focus will be on the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy aspect, 
to the extent it goes beyond illegality. This is because recent in-
stances of churches engaging in clearly illegal behavior appear to 
be extremely rare, which is not surprising given that such behavior 
could result in penalties for churches and their leaders that are 
much more severe than any loss of tax benefits. For example, the 
57. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-25-015 Oune 21, 2013). 
58. Id. 
59. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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First Church of Cannabis decided to avoid a confrontation with In-
diana law enforcement authorities over sacramental use of mariju-
ana even though it had already secured recognition of its tax-ex-
empt status from the IRS.60 That said, we will revisit the topic of 
illegality in Part V, including whether only criminal illegality 
should be a basis for a church losing tax benefits. 
We begin by considering whether Bob Jones University should be 
limited to racial discrimination, given the arguably unique history 
of that form of discrimination in the United States. We conclude 
that it should not, and therefore we then consider discrimination 
on various other often prohibited grounds, including, but not lim-
ited to, sexual orientation. We also consider the sanctuary church 
movement that seeks to protect undocumented immigrants from 
enforcement of federal immigration laws and other possible con-
flict areas. 
A. Why the Uniqueness of Racial Discrimination in Educa-
tion Should Not Control 
The IRS and ultimately the Supreme Court recognized that there 
was a fundamental public policy against racial discrimination in 
education.61 However, the Court also noted that "[f]ew social or po-
litical issues in our history have been more vigorously debated and 
more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimination, 
particularly in education."62 As Professor Olatunde Johnson states, 
60. See Mark Alesia & Gabby Ferreira, Humor, love, police a strange mix at Cannabis 
Church, lNDYSTAR Ouly 1, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/07/0l/hu-
mor-police-presence-mixed-cannabis-church-site/29561919 / [https:/ /perma.cc/ND4N-
GGGJ]; John Tuohy, First Church of Cannabis wins IRS nonprofit status, INDYSTAR Oune 
2, 2015), https:/ /www.indystar.com/story /news/2015/06/02/first-church-cannabis-wins-
irs-nonprofit-status/28357541/ [https://perma.cc/JBE9-3L8T]. While not required to ap-
ply for recognition of exemption under I.RC. § 501(c)(3), churches may voluntarily 
choose to do so as the First Church of Cannabis apparently did. See I.RC.§ 508(c)(l)(A) 
(exception from notification requirement to claim tax exemption under I.RC. 
§ 50l(c)(3)); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS OR-
GANIZATIONS, PUBLICATION 1828, at 3 (2015). 
61. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,595 (1983). 
62. Id. 
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"the historical context ... provides ... crucial context for under-
standing the Court's decision."63 That context included de facto con-
tinuing segregation in education through the creation of numerous 
private schools, such as the Goldsboro Christian Schools, that lim-
ited their students to whites, often with the encouragement and 
even financial support of southern state govemments.64 
None of the policies discussed below, and particularly not the 
policies relating to sex discrimination and immigration that are the 
most likely to qualify as fundamental currently, have a similar con-
text. The longstanding religious teachings relating to the roles of 
men and women both in religious leadership and more generally 
are not being used to justify the creation of numerous segregated 
or discriminatory institutions designed to frustrate the policy 
against sex discrimination, although it must be acknowledged that 
the effect of those teachings has been and still is significant within 
those faiths that follow them.65 Nor are longstanding religious 
teachings relating to welcoming strangers and foreigners being 
used to support the creation of new institutions to frustrate immi-
gration laws, and the number of sanctuary churches and sheltered 
immigrants appears to be relatively small.66 If, therefore, Bob Jones 
63. Johnson, supra note 14, at 128; see also KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMITIONS: NECES-
SARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? 163--67 (2016) (distinguishing opposing same-sex mar-
riage from opposing interracial marriage in the context of determining appropriate ex-
emptions from anti-discrimination laws, in part based on the history of racial 
discrimination in the United States). 
64. Johnson, supra note 14, at 131; see also Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity of 
Religious Schools and Tax Exemption, 40 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 255, 317 (2017); Galston, 
supra note 14, at 319; Herzig & Brunson, supra note 14, at 1116; Karla W. Simon, The Tax-
Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAX L. REV. 477,477 (1981); 
Sally Wagenmaker, Why Religious Organizations Shouldn't Lose Tax-Exempt Status Based 
on Public Policy, Post-Obergefell, at 31 (2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfrn?abstract_id=3104688 [https://perma.cc/6TAP-53AW]. 
65. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
66. See Thomas Scott-Railton, Note, A Legal Sanctuary: How the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act Could Protect Sanctuary Churches, 128 YALE L.J. 408, 421-23 (2018); Kaitlyn 
Schallhorn, What's a sanctuary church? A look at the policy and its legality in the US, Fox 
NEWS Guly 17, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/whats-a-sanctuary-church-a-
look-at-the-policy-and-its-legality-in-us [https://perma.cc/E4KK-YWGD]; infra notes 
114, 115, and accompanying text. 
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University is viewed as limited not only to "fundamental" public 
policies but also to situations that are historically unusual if not 
unique, in part because there is a concerted, large-scale effort to 
frustrate the policy, it does not appear any of the current conflicts 
rise to this level.67 
There are at least two significant problems with this approach, 
however. First, that is simply not what the Court (or the IRS) said 
with respect to the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine. 
On its face, that doctrine provides that once an otherwise charitable 
organization's activities are shown to be contrary to fundamental 
public policy, and if those activities rise to a significant enough 
level relative to the organization's overall activities, then the organ-
ization loses the tax benefits that usually come with that status.68 It 
does not matter whether the organization or its activities are new, 
whether the organization is an outlier or part of a larger movement 
opposing the policy at issue, or whether there are any other distin-
guishing historical characteristics.69 Furthermore, this understand-
ing of the doctrine is consistent with the overall approach of the 
IRS, and the underlying statutes, with respect to tax benefits; organ-
izations qualify or fail to qualify based on their characteristics and 
actions, not generally based on the larger context in which they and 
their actions exist.7° 
Second, this approach creates another ambiguous line that has to 
be drawn to determine if the doctrine applies. It would require the 
IRS and courts to wrestle not only with whether a given public pol-
67. See David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption-Beyond Ef-
ficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 53-54 (2006); 
Buckles, supra note 64, at 311-12; Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the 
Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the 
Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 1013 (2010). But see John D. Inazu, The Four 
Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 837-43 (2014) (rejecting 
the argument that racial discrimination is distinctly worse as compared to other forms 
of discrimination such that the government is justified and permitted to prohibit racial 
but not other forms of discrimination by private groups). 
68. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,586, 591-92 (1983). 
69. See id. 
70. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3) (2018); Treas. Reg.§§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(a)-{c) (2018). 
164 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 44 
icy is "fundamental," and whether an otherwise charitable organi-
zation's actions contrary to that policy are relatively significant, but 
also whether those actions are somehow similar historically to ra-
cial discrimination. Such a determination is likely one that the IRS 
is even more ill-suited to make than the fundamental public policy 
determination. While the IRS is required to make the latter deter-
mination based on the position it asserted and the Court upheld in 
Bob Jones University, that decision does not require the former de-
termination. This distinguishing based on historical context ap-
proach therefore appears to be both legally unjustifiable and im-
practical.71 
We therefore need to consider whether conflicts exist now, or are 
likely to exist in the future, between the practices of a significant 
number of churches and fundamental public policies. 
B. Discrimination in Employment, Services, and Member-
ship 
This Part considers the types of discrimination currently disfa-
vored in at least some contexts by federal law to determine whether 
federal policy could either currently or in the near future rise to the 
level of a fundamental public policy and, if it could, whether that 
policy would conflict with the practices of a significant number of 
churches.72 More specifically, this Part details that while racial dis-
crimination by private individuals and organizations is widely dis-
favored, federal law does not prohibit such discrimination in all 
contexts. For example, in the employment context, federal law 
reaches only organizations that have a certain number of employ-
ees.73 Federal law also does not generally prohibit racial discrimi-
nation with respect to the membership of private organizations, alt-
hough in the wake of a court decision concluding that social clubs 
71. See Brunson & Herzig, supra note 33, at 1206-07 (rejecting treating Bob Jones Uni-
versity as an outlier). 
72. See id. at 1213-15 (considering the use of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish 
a framework for applying the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018) (defining employer in the context of civil rights legis-
lation as having fifteen or more employees). 
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could qualify for tax exemption even if they discriminated on the 
basis of race, Congress decided to deny exemption to social clubs if 
they have a written policy that discriminates on the basis of race, 
color, or religion.74 And federal law prohibits racial discrimination 
in the provision of goods or services only in certain industries that 
provide public accommodations.75 Similar limitations apply to fed-
eral law relating to disfavored discrimination of other types, such 
as those based on ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, age, disa-
bility, and veteran status.76 
In addition, the Supreme Court has found that the First Amend-
ment requires what has come to be known as a "ministerial excep-
tion" to employment discrimination laws in order to protect the 
ability of churches and other religious organizations, such as reli-
gious schools, to select their leaders. 77 
1. Racial, Ethnic, and National Origin Discrim-
ination 
The employment context provides the strongest example of an 
anti-discrimination policy that has become fundamental. As was 
the case with racial discrimination in education when Bob Jones Uni-
versity was decided, federal government animus toward racial, eth-
nic, and national origin discrimination in employment can be found 
in a wide range of congressionally enacted statutes, executive 
74. See I.R.C. § 501(i); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59 (D.D.C. 1972); 
Jim Langley & Conrad Rosenberg, Social Clubs-IRC 501(c)(7), in EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PRO-
GRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 15 (1996), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eo-
topicc96.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU2H-7L VB]. 
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2018). 
76. See, e.g., id. § 12101 (2018). But it is worth noting that not all types of discrimina-
tion are or should be prohibited. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and 
the Nondiscrimination Norm, in MATTERS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND LEGAL 
RESPONSE (Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming) (2012), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm ?abstract_id=2087599 [https:/ /perma.cc/Y8W8-LG6B]. 
77. Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berm, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020); 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188-89 
(2012). 
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branch pronouncements, and judicial decisions.7B The Court has, as 
noted previously, created a ministerial exception to these laws for 
the employment of ministers by religious organizations under the 
First Amendment.79 That the First Amendment may prohibit gov-
ernments from flatly prohibiting such discrimination with respect 
to ministerial employment does not, however, necessarily mean it 
prohibits governments from conditioning tax benefits on not en-
gaging in such discrimination. 
But it is hard to identify any churches, much less a significant 
number, that openly and defiantly discriminate on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, or national origin in employment.Bo The denominations 
that historically were most supportive of first slavery and then ra-
cial segregation, such as the Southern Baptist Convention, have 
now denounced racial discrimination in the strongest terms.Bl And 
the denominations that historically have been affiliated with a par-
ticular racial minority, such as the National Baptist Convention, ar-
guably do not run afoul of this federal policy because any bias they 
have favors historically disadvantaged racial minorities.B2 This is 
78. See David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Pol-
icy, and "Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 389, 403-04 (2000). 
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
80. One minor exception may be churches with strong ethnic associations, such as 
Orthodox Jewish synagogues and Russian or Greek Orthodox churches, that limit 
membership to persons of the relevant ethic background or at least place additional 
membership qualifications on a believer from outside the relevant ethnic group. See 
Heather Miller Rubens, "Something Has Gone Wrong": The JFS Case and Defining Jewish 
Identity in the Courtroom, 29 MD. J. INT'L L. 366, 368-69 (2014) (United Kingdom court 
decision finding that the denial of preferential consideration for an applicant to a reli-
gious school was ethnic discrimination when it was based on their mother not being 
considered Jewish and their unwillingness to undergo an Orthodox conversion); Eu-
gene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1919, 1921 (2006) (asserting "Orthodox Jewish synagogues discriminate based on eth-
nicity ... in choosing rabbis and members"). 
81. See SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, RESOLUTION ON RACIAL RECONCILIATION 




82. See Brennen, supra note 78, at 439 (concluding that there is no clearly established 
federal public policy against affirmative action). 
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not to say there have not been credible allegations of isolated in-
stances of racism; for example, in June 2018 the Southern Baptist 
Convention expelled a church based on II clear evidence of the 
church's intentional discriminatory acts."83 So while it is possible 
that out of the hundreds of thousands of churches in the United 
States84 the IRS might become aware of a handful that engage in 
intentional racial discrimination in employment, the relative rare-
ness of such practices among churches, the assumption that such 
churches are likely to be small, and the First Amendment issues 
raised by the existence of the ministerial exception, may under-
standably lead the IRS to decide to deploy its limited enforcement 
resources elsewhere. Any conflict in this particular area would 
therefore be rare to nonexistent. 
With respect to the provision of goods and services, the federal 
government also has a strong policy against racial discrimination, 
but only with respect to the provision of certain goods and services 
in II a place of public accommodation" that affects interstate com-
merce or is supported by a state government (such as hotels, res-
taurants, and entertainment venues).85 The limited reach of most 
churches and the lack of direct state financial support for them 
would seem to place them beyond the scope of that policy. While 
hypothetically one can imagine a church that operated, for exam-
ple, a hotel open to the public, similar to the Second Baptist Church 
of Goldsboro's operating the Goldsboro Christian Schools (through 
the same legal entity as the church), as a practical matter such a sit-
uation is likely to be rare or nonexistent. (In addition, when a 
83. Carma Henry, Georgia Church Expelled from Southern Baptist Convention Over Racial 
Discrimination Charges, WESTSIDE GAZETTE CTune 13, 2018), https://thewestsidega-
zette.com/georgia-church-expelled-from-southem-baptist-convention-over-racial-dis-
crimination-charges/ [https://perma.cc/X84O-KKN A]. 
84. Fast Facts About American Religion, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RESEARCH, 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/research/fastfacts/fast_facts.html#numcong 
[https:/ /perma.cc/W96W-SADP]. 
85. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Of course it is not always clear whether 
a group is providing a "public accommodation." See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Associations 
and the Constitution: Four Questions about Four Freedoms, 92 N.C. L. REV. 917, 924-27 
(2014). 
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church engages in racial discrimination that "can reasonably be ex-
pected to aggravate the disparity in the educational, economic, or 
social levels of [a racial] group when compared with society as a 
whole,"86 such as by operating a racially discriminatory school, the 
government's interest in extending the contrary-to-fundamental-
public-policy doctrine to the church is arguably strong enough to 
overcome the arguments advanced in this Article for not doing so 
with respect to churches generally.87) 
Finally, with respect to membership, the IRS Chief Counsel's of-
fice has concluded that "exclud[ing] from participation in or 
den[ying] the benefits of a program or activity to individuals solely 
on the basis of race so that it can be reasonably be expected to ag-
gravate the disparity in the educational, economic, or social levels 
of that group when compared with society as a whole" violates fun-
damental public policy.88 It is not clear, however, that this conclu-
sion extends to membership in a church or attendance at a church 
gathering, absent clear evidence such membership or attendance 
provides significant educational, economic, or social benefits, par-
ticularly given the First Amendment associational as well as free 
exercise concerns raised by such an extension. Therefore, even if the 
IRS became aware of a church that intentionally engaged in racial 
discrimination with respect to its membership or attendance-
which appears to be a rare circumstance under any conditions-it 
likely would rightly conclude that such behavior does not rise to 
the level of being contrary to fundamental public policy.89 There-
fore, while prohibiting racial discrimination in some, but not all, 
86. I.RS. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-10-001 (Mar. 10, 1989); I.RS. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,792 
(Aug. 17, 1987). 
87. See infra text accompanying note 367. 
88. Supra note 33. 
89. While the IRS did revoke the tax-exempt status of a racist church apparently 
based on Bob Jones University, both IRS's reasoning and the facts it deemed relevant are 
unclear. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. It is therefore impossible to tell if that 
decision was inconsistent with the above-cited I.RS. General Counsel Memorandum, 
which Memorandum was later in time and so presumably would be a better indication 
of the IRS's position in this respect under any conditions. See supra note 33 and accom-
panying text. 
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contexts almost certainly is a fundamental public policy, an actual 
conflict is unlikely in those contexts because of the lack of such be-
havior by a significant number of churches.90 
2. Sex Discrimination 
While intentional racial discrimination appears to be rare among 
churches, intentional sex discrimination is much more widespread. 
The most obvious example is the position taken by many religious 
institutions, including the Catholic Church, a significant number of 
Protestant churches, more theologically conservative Jewish syna-
gogues, and some bodies in other religions, that certain leadership 
roles are reserved for men. Some faiths also explicitly teach that 
women and men have different roles in society more generally.91 
Beyond explicit policies with respect to leadership and societal 
roles, there has also been at least one recent public dispute in a ma-
jor denomination relating to the treatment of women. In a decision 
that was controversial within that denomination, a Southern Bap-
tist seminary decided to fire a longtime Southern Baptist leader in 
the wake of criticism for his alleged treatment of and teachings 
about women, including how he responded to two students who 
90. Outside of the church context, there has been speculation (but no IRS rulings or 
other guidance) that tax-exempt hate groups promoting white supremacy may now 
run afoul of the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine, notwithstanding First 
Amendment concerns. See, e.g., David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Opinion, White 
Supremacist Groups Don't Deserve Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/opinion/white-supremacists-tax-exemp-
tions.html [https://nyti.ms/2weafrQ]; Darryll K. Jones, House of Representatives Passes 
Resolution Condemning Hate Speech: Fundamental Public Policy Yet?, NONPROFIT LAW 
PROF BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2019/01/ 
house-of-representatives-passes-resolution-condemning-hate-speech-fundarnental-
public-policy-yet.htrnl [https://perma.cc/9GTF-VHMM]. 
91. See, e.g., THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, THE FAMILY: A 
PROCLAMATION TO THE WORLD (1995) (teaching that, "[b ]y divine design, fathers are to 
preside over their families in love and righteousness and are responsible to provide the 
necessities of life and protection for their families. Mothers are primarily responsible 
for the nurture of their children"). See generally Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's 
Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453,458 n.30 
& 459-69 (1992); Caroline Mala Corbin, Expanding the Bob Jones Compromise, in LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STA TES 123, 133, 147-49 (Austin Sa-
rat ed., 2012). 
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alleged they had been sexually assaulted by others and his teach-
ings regarding "the Bible's view of women and his belief that 
spousal abuse is not grounds for divorce." 92 
The key question in this context is therefore whether federal gov-
ernment policies relating to sex discrimination, in the employment 
context and beyond, have become fundamental. The Court in Bob 
Jones University made this determination with respect to racial dis-
crimination in education by looking at the extent of actions of the 
three branches of the federal government and the time period over 
which those branches consistently opposed such discrimination.93 
With respect to sex discrimination, Congress included in Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a prohibition on discrimination in 
employment on the basis of sex and a year earlier enacted the Equal 
Pay Act, which prohibited paying women and men unequally for 
equal work.94 It also enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972, which prohibited sex discrimination in education pro-
grams receiving federal funds and broadened the reach of that pro-
vision in 1988, including refusing to exclude churches.95 
While initially the federal courts resisted a robust prohibition on 
sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, for the past forty or so years state action in-
volving such discrimination has been subject to an "intermediate" 
level of scrutiny (somewhere between the "strict scrutiny" that ap-
plies to racial discrimination and the rational basis scrutiny that ap-
plies generally).96 This level of scrutiny led to, for example, the Su-
preme Court concluding that the male-only admissions policy of 
92. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Southern Baptist seminary drops bombshell: Why Paige Pat-
terson was fired, WASH. POST Gune 1, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/06/0l/southem-baptist-seminary-drops-
bombshell-why-paige-patterson-was-fired [https:/ /perma.cc/ST7G-FB5X]. 
93. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593-95 (1983); see also Hatfield et 
al., supra note 14, at 3. 
94. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
95. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2018); Stephen L. Mikochik, Caesar's Coin: Federal 
Funds, Civil Rights, and Churches, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 193, 193-94 (1991). 
96. See Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 
1328-29 (2018). 
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the Virginia Military Institute, a public university, violated the 
Constitution.97 The executive branch not only has long prohibited 
sex discrimination in government employment generally but, for 
example, has increasingly permitted women to seek combat posi-
tions in the military, most recently graduating the first female Ma-
rines from its infantry officer course in the wake of the decision to 
open all combat roles to women.98 Even without the ratification of 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution,99 it there-
fore appears that prohibiting sex discrimination, at least in the em-
ployment context, is now a fundamental public policy since all 
three branches of the federal government now have a decades-long, 
broad, and consistent policy of rejecting it.100 While the IRS has in 
the past decided that sex discrimination was not "clearly contrary 
to public policy,"101 those decisions do not reflect these more recent 
legal developments. Some commentators have therefore called 
upon the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of religious organiza-
tions that engage in this type of discrimination.102 
97. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,519 (1996). 
98. See Kevin Lui, In a Landmark First, the U.S. Marines Now Has a Female Infantry Of-
ficer, TIME (Sept. 26, 2017), https://time.com/4956767/us-marines-first-female-infantry-
officer [https:/ /perma.cc/S2KV-EL68]. 
99. The ratification of the ERA by Virginia on January 15, 2020 does not necessarily 
mean the ERA is now part of the Constitution, both because Congress placed a time 
limit on ratification that expired in 1982 and because several states have rescinded their 
previous ratifications. Darlene Ricker, What does Equal Rights Amendment ratification in 
Virginia mean for its chances?, ABA JOURNAL Oan. 16, 2020), http://www.abajour-
nal.com/web/article/era-ratification-in-virginia-doesnt-seal-its-fate-timing-is-every-
thing [https://perma.ccNL3P-3F2Q]. 
100. See Hatfield et al., supra note 14, at 40. 
101. See, e.g., I.RS. Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-44-007 Ouly 28, 1977); Moritz v. Comm'r, 55 
T.C. 113, 115 (1970). 
102. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 91, at 485; Corbin, supra note 91, at 134-35, 156-58; cf 
Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the 
Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 61-63 (1972) (arguing that the tax benefits enjoyed 
by most tax-exempt organizations are sufficient to render them state actors and so pro-
hibited from discriminating on various grounds, including sex). But see COREY 
BRETISCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? 134-36 (2012) (ar-
guing that the position of at least some churches with respect to women and homosex-
ual people is not so clearly opposed to the ideal of free and equal citizenship to justify 
removing their federal income tax benefits); Timothy J. Tracey, Bob Jonesing: Same-Sex 
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So why has the IRS not acted in this area? A cynical explanation 
is that the IRS is much weaker politically than it was in the 1970s 
and so has no stomach for the backlash that would undoubtedly 
occur if it were to pursue such a controversial course of action.103 A 
more principled explanation is that the IRS has concluded that since 
such discrimination most commonly occurs with respect to the se-
lection of religious leaders, the constitutionally based ministerial 
exception-not at issue in Bob Jones University-would prevent re-
voking the tax-exempt status of a religious organization that en-
gages in such discrimination. 
3. Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
As is the case with sex discrimination, many faiths intentionally 
discriminate on the basis of either conduct associated with sexual 
orientation104 or, less commonly, sexual orientation itself.105 Such 
discrimination is almost certainly more pervasive than sex discrim-
ination, particularly given that many faiths believe that same-sex 
sexual relationships are inherently wrong, potentially disqualifying 
Marriage and the Hankering to Strip Religious Institutions of Their Tax-Exempt Status, 11 
FIU L. REV. 85, 92 (2015) (concluding without much discussion that sex discrimination 
is not contrary to fundamental public policy). 
103. See generally Amy Moore, Rife with Latent Power: Exploring the Reach of the IRS to 
Determine Tax-Exempt Status According to Public Policy Rationale in an Era of Judicial Def-
erence, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 117, 138, 156-57 (2014) (arguing Chevron deference "has made 
the IRS rife with [latent] power" that Congress can choose to use when it becomes po-
litically prudent). 
104. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, '!['I[ 2357-2359 (2016) (distin-
guishing between homosexual conduct, which is "intrinsically disordered," and homo-
sexual orientation); CHRISTIAN REFORMED CHURCH, HOMOSEXUALITY, 
https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/position-statements/homosexuality 
[https://perma.cc/UB7M-7H53] (distinguishing between individuals with a homosex-
ual orientation, who can fully participate in the life of the church, and individuals prac-
ticing homosexuality, which is identified as sinful); SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, 
RESOLUTION ON HOMOSEXUALITY, (1988), http://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolu-
tions/resolution-on-homosexuality-5/ [https://perma.cc/SHD4-69AF] (citations omit-
ted) ('That we maintain that while God loves the homosexual and offers salvation, ho-
mosexuality is not a normal lifestyle and is an abomination in the eyes of God."). 
105. Denny Burk, Is Homosexual Orientation Sinful?, ERLC (Feb. 18, 2014), 
https://er le.com/resource-library /articles/is-homosexual-orientation-sinful 
[https://perma.cc/YXW3-ZH9R] (arguing that homosexual orientation, and not just be-
havior, is sinful). 
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those involved in such relationships from leadership roles and even 
from membership.106 
However, commentators generally acknowledge that the federal 
government as a whole has not taken a consistent position against 
such discrimination, much less a strong and longstanding position 
sufficient to render this policy fundamental. 107 Then-IRS Commis-
sioner Koskinen appeared to take this position in 2015 as well, alt-
hough he left the door open for reconsideration in the future. 108 It is 
true that the Supreme Court in the recent case of Bostock v. Clayton 
County takes the position that Congress has long outlawed sexual 
orientation discrimination in employment by outlawing discrimi-
nation based on sex.109 But the repeated failure of Congress to enact 
an explicit prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination indi-
cates at least some inconsistency in that branch's position.110 The 
Obergefell oral argument exchange was therefore at best premature; 
whether such discrimination by churches or other religious organ-
izations ever truly becomes an "issue" the IRS and courts will need 
to wrestle with, it certainly does not rise to that level yet. This is 
106. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section 501(c)(3) Ex-
emption of Religious Organizations That Discriminate, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 715, 
717-19 (2009) (providing examples). 
107. See, e.g., CONG. RsCH. SERV., R44244, RECOGNITTON OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS 27 (2015); Brunson & Herzig, supra note 33, at 
1187; Buckles, supra note 64, at 308-10; Hatfield, supra note 14, at 90; Nicholas Mirkay, 
Is It Charitable to Discriminate: The Necessary Transformation of Section 501(c)(3) into the 
Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 45, 67-68 (2007); Tracey, supra note 102, at 
92-93; Wagenmaker, supra note 64, at 24-27; Kirsten Berg & Moiz Syed, Under Trump, 
LGBTQ Progress Is Being Reversed in Plain Sight, PROPuBLICA, (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https:/ /projects. propublica.org/graphics/lgbtq-rights-rollback [https://perma.cc/S3V3-
8L5M]. But see Dyllan Moreno Taxman, What About Bob? The Continuing Problem of Fed-
erally-Subsidized LGB Discrimination in Higher Education, 34 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 39, 
64-65 (2019) (arguing that at least some forms of sexual orientation discrimination, such 
as not providing housing to same-sex married couple on the same basis as to opposite-
sex married couples, may now be contrary to fundamental public policy). 
108. Hearing on Revisiting IRS Targeting: Progress of Agency Reforms and Congressional 
Options Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Fed. Rts. and Fed. Cts. of the S. 
Comm. On the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of John Koskinen, Internal Reve-
nue Service Commissioner). 
109. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). 
110. See id. at 1822-24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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particularly true given the protection provided to religiously moti-
vated actions by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which, as 
the Court in Bostock noted, requires the government to have a com-
pelling interest and use the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest when substantially burdening a person's exercise of reli-
gion.111 But if it did rise to the level of a fundamental public policy 
at some point in the future, it would likely raise issues similar to 
those that the IRS currently faces with respect to sex discrimination 
and which will be explored further in Part V below. 
4. Other Forms of Discrimination 
The federal government also prohibits discrimination based on 
certain other grounds in some contexts, including employment. 
Such other grounds include religion, age, disability, and veteran 
status.112 Congress has understandably exempted religious organi-
zations from the statutory prohibition on religious discrimination 
in employment, 113 however, and there is no reason to conclude that 
the application of this particular policy would apply to churches in 
any other context. As for age and disability, as with racial discrim-
ination, it appears that churches intentionally discriminating on 
these bases, whether in employment, provision of goods and ser-
vices, or membership, are rare to nonexistent and therefore unlikely 
to create a significant conflict even if these policies are considered 
fundamental. Finally, one could imagine that those faiths with a 
pacifist tradition might discriminate against veterans in employ-
ment decisions, particularly for religious leaders, but it is more 
likely that they would discriminate based on whether an individual 
currently holds pacifist beliefs, which a veteran certainly could, ra-
ther than veteran status itself. So none of these federally disfavored 
bases for making decisions are likely to result in significant conflicts 
under Bob Jones University. 
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2018); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. 
112. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018). 
113. See id.§ 2000e-l(a). 
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C. Protecting and Serving Undocumented Immigrants 
The increasingly heated debates over immigration raise a possi-
ble point of conflict outside of the discrimination context. Some 
churches have provided sanctuary for immigrants who are in this 
country illegally to protect them from possible deportation actions, 
based on the churches' religious convictions.114 To date the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) has criticized such actions but not pur-
sued criminal or civil charges against the churches involved or their 
leaders.115 However, this was not the case in the 1980s, when the 
federal government successfully prosecuted individuals associated 
with the sanctuary movement.116 At least one commentator has ar-
gued pursuing such charges today might run afoul of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, enacted in 1993.117 But should the IRS re-
consider the tax benefits enjoyed by these churches under Bob Jones 
University even absent a finding by the DOJ or the courts that such 
activities are illegal? 
114. See Schallhorn, supra note 66; Bobby Allyn & Michel Marizco, Jury Acquits Aid 
Worker Accused Of Helping Border-Crossing Migrants in Arizona, NPR, (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/11/21/781658800/jury-acquits-aid-worker-accused-of-help-
ing-border-crossing-migrants-in-arizona [https://perma.cc/KLMS-HZFG] (describing 
how a humanitarian aid worker employed by Unitarian Universalist Church-affiliated 
ministry was acquitted of helping migrants). The legal history of sanctuary, particularly 
under common law, is lengthy and complicated. See generally JOHN BAKER, INTRODUC-
TION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HlsTORY 553-54 (5th ed. 2019). 
115. See Church Sanctuary for Illegal Aliens, 7 Op. O.L.C. 168 (1983), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/l 983/10/31/op-olc-v007-
p0168 _ 0. pdf [https://perma.cc/8RHM-NCP3] (criticizing practice and concluding any 
asserted legal defenses would be insufficient); Jason Hanna, Can churches provide legal 
sanctuary to undocumented immigrants, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www .cnn.com/2017 /02/17 /us/immigrants-sanctuary-churches-legality-tmd/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/Z9P2-CAWD] (reporting that "[i]n general, prosecutors 
probably won't go after a pastor" according to a former DOJ Office of Immigration 
Litigation assistant attorney general). 
116. See generally Scott-Railton, supra note 66, at 417-19. 
117. See id. at 419, 433-49. 
J-
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The history of immigration and immigration laws in the United 
States is lengthy and complicated, including with respect to en-
forcement of those laws.118 That said, Congress has certainly en-
acted laws limiting immigration and imposing penalties-primar-
ily deportation-for violations of those laws, and the executive 
branch and the courts have a long history of enforcing and applying 
those laws and penalties.119 While it could be argued that the degree 
of enforcement varies among administrations, preventing the de-
portation of immigrants who are in the United States illegally ap-
pears to be contrary to fundamental public policy given the dec-
ades-long support of all three branches for deportation of many 
immigrants in the country illegally.120 
Professor Ellen P. Aprill has considered this issue and is skeptical 
that the IRS would pursue revocation of tax exemption in sanctuary 
situations for a variety of reasons, including the lack of a clear find-
ing of illegal activity by the DOJ, the fact that providing such sanc-
tuary would likely be a relatively small part of a given church's ac-
tivities, the limited resources of the IRS, and the historical 
unwillingness of the IRS to expand the application of the contrary-
to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine beyond racial discrimina-
tion in education.121 That said, she acknowledges that in theory the 
IRS could apply the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doc-
trine in this context to strip sanctuary churches of their federal tax 
118. See generally WALTER A. EWING, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION 
POL'Y CTR., OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POL-
ICY (2012), https://americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/oppor-
tunity_exclusion_Oll312.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRM7-QPGY]. 
119. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (2007). 
120. See, e.g., Alex Nowrasteh, Deportation Rates in Historical Perspective, CATO AT LIB-
ERTY (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.cato.org/blog/deportation-rates-historical-perspec-
tive [https://perma.cc/HZF4-7MKF] (finding more than 100,000 deportations per year 
under the administration of President Bill Clinton and every presidential administra-
tion since). 
121. See Ellen P. Aprill, Religious Organizations, Refuge for Undocumented Immigrants, 
and Tax Exemption, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2017-28, 1-5 (2017). 
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benefits.122 This area therefore may be another current conflict un-
der the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine of Bob Jones 
University. 
D. Other Possible Conflicts 
Additionally, relatively rare situations in which a church runs 
afoul of Bob Jones University have arisen or could arise, including 
with respect to polygamy, marijuana, human rights violations, and 
sexual abuse. For example, the IRS has denied tax-exempt status as 
recently as 2013 to organizations that supported the (state law) 
criminal activity of polygamy, which the IRS concluded was also 
contrary to federal public policy.123 The IRS based those denials on 
multiple grounds, including that support of polygamy is neces-
sarily both support for violating state laws and contrary to funda-
mental federal policy.124 Despite their illegality, plural marriages 
are still somewhat common in the United States.125 And across the 
globe, there are possibly more polygamous societies than there are 
monogamous ones.126 Most relevant to the current discussion, some 
American churches endorse the practice as part of their religion, 
particularly the fundamentalist Latter Day Saints churches.127 In ad-
dition, one report estimates that anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 
122. See id. at 4-5. 
123. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 2013-25-015 CTnne 21, 2013) (involving a church); IRS Priv. 
Ltr. Ru!. 2013-23-025 CTnne 7, 2013) (involving a non-church educational and charitable 
organization). Despite the recent legal victories for same-sex marriage, it seems rm-
likely that there will be similar victories in the near future for polygamy. See, e.g., John 
Witte, Jr., Why No Polygamy, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION INF AMIL Y LAW 446-
66 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018). 
124. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 2013-25-015, supra note 57; see also I.RS. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 
2013-23-025, supra note 57. 
125. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Jessica Bennett, 
Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution?, NEWSWEEK CTuly 28, 2009), 
https://www .newsweek.com/polyamory-next-sexual-revolution-82053 
[https://perma.cc/S9PX-9YTC] (estimating 500,000 polyamorous families in the United 
States)). 
126. Jack B. Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHION.U. L. REV. 89, 94 (2015). 
127. See, e.g., Jason D. Berkowitz, Beneath the Veil of Mormonism: Uncovering the Truth 
About Polygamy in the United States and Canada, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 615, 616 
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Muslims currently live in polygamous families in the United 
States.128 So while to date it appears few organizations and even 
fewer churches have both explicitly supported the practice of po-
lygamy and sought IRS recognition of tax-exempt status-the 2013 
denials being an outlier-it is certainly possible that more conflicts 
over this issue could occur in the future. 
In contrast and as mentioned earlier, the IRS appears not to have 
had a problem with recognizing the tax-exempt status of a church 
that was candid regarding its intent to incorporate marijuana use 
into its religious rituals despite the fact that such use was illegal 
under federal law and under the law of the state where the church 
was located.129 And while this church is not unique, in that there 
also a number of such churches in California,13° it does not appear 
the IRS is challenging the tax-exempt status of any of them. How-
ever, because the IRS does not generally provide explanations for 
rulings recognizing tax-exempt status or for why it is not choosing 
to challenge the existing tax-exempt status of an organization,131 it 
is unclear why it is taking this position. And, of course, its position 
could change if the federal government decides to more aggres-
sively prosecute marijuana offenses. 
Some churches might also support or directly engage in activities 
that violate human rights. For example, some churches, particularly 
(2007); see also Eve D'Onofrio, Child Brides, Inegalitarianism, and the Fundamentalist Po-
lygamous Family in the United States, 19 INT'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAM. 373, 375-76 (2005). 
128. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy, NPR 
(May 27, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90857818 
[https://perma.cc/VE2N-VBLX]. 
129. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
130. See Arit John, Inside the War For California's Cannabis Churches, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 
23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ll/23/style/weed-church-california.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2O A WCLn]. 
131. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS COMPLAINT PROCESS FOR TAX EXEMPT OR-
GANIZATIONS 2 (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-08-13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KH9N-YGGB] (noting that the IRS is prohibited from publicly dis-
closing whether it has initiated an examination or the result of any examination); Terri 
Lynn Helge, Rejecting Charity: Why the IRS Denies Tax Exemption to 501(c)(3) Applicants, 
14 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 2 (2016) (stating that favorable IRS tax exemption determination 
letters "do[] not set forth the reasons why the organization's application was ap-
proved"). 
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ones that could be characterized as cults, might actively work to 
prevent individuals from leaving the church.132 Other possible hu-
man rights violations could include pressuring spouses to stay in 
abusive marriages, or, some would argue, putting church members 
through "gay conversion therapy."133 The latter is unlikely to con-
stitute the contravention of a fundamental public policy, even 
though now outlawed in some states, 134 but certainly allowing in-
dividuals to choose their faith is a longstanding human right recog-
nized by the federal government, 135 and preventing domestic vio-
lence has (albeit more recently) also attained that status.136 
However, in practice, such activities rarely rise to the level of legally 
actionable coercion and, when they do, likely also involve illegal 
criminal actions that would provide a clearer basis for loss of tax-
exempt status if a church directly engaged in such actions.137 The 
IRS therefore might not face a situation where a church has engaged 
132. See Cecilia M. Weigel, Note, Trafficking Cults: Why Courts Should Adopt a Broad 
Reading of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act to Ensure Protection of Cult Victims, 30 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 272 (2020) ("In some instances, cults force their members to stay 
within the group."). 
133. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Overlooked Costs of Religious Deference, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363, 1373-77 (2007) (reporting findings that "[r]eligious groups 
often acquiesce in or, worse, condone family violence within the community"); Susan 
L. Morrow & A. Lee Beckstead, Conversion Therapies for Same-Sex Attracted Clients in 
Religious Conflict: Context, Predisposing Factors, Experiences, and Implications for Therapy, 
32 COUNSELING PSYCH. 641, 642 (2004). 
134. See Equality Maps: Conversion Therapy Laws, MOVEMENT ADV AN CEMENT PRO-
JECT, https://www .lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion_therapy [https:/ /perma.cc/ 
R6UD-GT2G); Derrick Bryson Taylor, Colorado Bans "Conversion Therapy" for Minors, 
N.Y. 11MES, Oune 1, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/0l/us/gay-conversion-
therapy-colorado.html [https://nyti.ms/2EHSbu7) (finding that eighteen states have 
banned conversion therapy for minors). 
135. See UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Art. 18 (approved by United 
States); INT'L COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLffiCAL RIGHTS, Art. 18 (ratified by United 
States). 
136. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 
1902. 
137. See Hava Dayan, Modern Day Slavery: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Slavery-Like Of-
fences in Charismatic Cults, 23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 42 n.3 (2016); Weigel, supra 
note 132, at 274 (asserting that courts in the United States generally do not find psycho-
logical coercion alone sufficient to provide the basis for a civil legal claim). 
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in such activities in such a way that violates fundamental public 
policy but does not constitute illegal criminal activity. 
Finally, the recent scandals involving various churches and al-
leged or proven sexual abuse could implicate the Bob Jones Univer-
sity decision but are unlikely to do so. There are few if any claims 
that the churches in question intentionally endorsed or directed 
such behavior, and so such behavior should not be attributed to 
them for tax exemption purposes. This remains the case even 
though liability might and often has attached to churches arising 
out of negligence relating to such abuse, under a theory of vicarious 
liability, or because of intentional efforts to cover up misbehavior 
that led to further abuse.138 
* * * 
In conclusion, there are at least several areas of current or likely 
future conflict between many churches and fundamental public 
policy, including sex discrimination in employment, sexual orien-
tation discrimination in employment, sanctuary provision to un-
documented immigrants, and polygamy. It is therefore necessary 
to determine how Bob Jones University should be applied to 
churches involved in such conflicts. 
III. CHURCHES AND TAXES 
Churches have historically often enjoyed tax exemptions and 
other tax benefits, as have their leaders. However, the exemptions 
and other benefits have not always been blanket ones, in large part 
because of their complicated history and their shifting justifica-
tions.139 This Part first briefly summarizes the existing tax benefits 
138. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & Aaron H. Cole, The Bishop's Alter Ego: Enter-
prise Liability and the Catholic Priest Sex Abuse Scandal, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 65, 68 
(2007); Mayo Moran, Cardinal Sins: How the Catholic Sexual Abuse Crisis Changed Private 
Law, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 95, 136-41 (2019). 
139. See, e.g., NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, PoLmCS, TAXES, AND THE PUL-
PIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 71-72 (2011); DEIRDRE DESSINGUE, The 
Special Case of Churches, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 173, 173-74 (Eve-
lyn Brody ed., 2002). 
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for such organizations in the United States and related conditions 
on them, then considers the constitutional provisions that may ei-
ther support or conflict with the existence of these benefits, and fi-
nally addresses the reasons put forward to support them. 
A. Existing Law 
Bob Jones University related to federal tax benefits, so it is appro-
priate to start there, especially since, for churches, those benefits are 
more extensive than those enjoyed by non-church religious organ-
izations.140 But there are also many tax benefits provided to 
churches at the state and local level, so this Part briefly discusses 
those benefits as well. 
1. Federal Tax Law 
Perhaps the most commonly known benefit, which churches 
share with other types of charities, is exemption from federal in-
come tax under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3). That pro-
vision extends exemption to "[c]orporations, and any community 
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals."141 This exemption is conditional in several ways, be-
yond the fundamental public policy condition upheld in the Bob 
Jones University decision. More specifically, Section 501(c)(3) denies 
exemption to an otherwise qualified organization if it distributes its 
net earnings to a private party, engages in a substantial amount of 
lobbying, or supports or opposes any candidate for elected public 
office.142 This exemption is also not unlimited, as it does not extend 
to "unrelated business taxable income" -oversimplifying, income 
140. See Robert H. Wood, Why Churches Are the Gold Standard of Tax-Exempt Organi-
zations, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rob-
ertwood/2015/09/22/lets-tax-churches/?sh=6flc608b322b [https://perma.cc/VM2S-
NVL8]. 
141. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (2018). 
142. See id. 
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from any regularly carried on trade or business that is not substan-
tially related to the organization's exempt purpose (and does not 
fall within a statutorily provided exception).143 A closely related 
benefit that is available to almost all Section 501(c)(3) organizations 
is the ability to receive donations that qualify as deductible charita-
ble contributions for donors; such donations are also generally ex-
empt from federal estate and gift taxes.144 Along with other 50l{c)(3) 
organizations, churches are also exempt from federal unemploy-
ment tax.145 
Churches enjoy a number of tax benefits generally not enjoyed by 
other 501(c)(3)s, including exemption from initial application and 
annual information return requirements and special protections re-
lating to tax inquiries and examinations.146 Ministers-that is or-
dained, commissioned, or licensed religious leaders who usually 
although not always serve in churches-also enjoy a number of sig-
nificant tax benefits, including the ability to exclude from their tax-
able income the value of housing provided to them by a church or 
cash compensation paid to them to provide housing.147 
Particularly since some benefits are only available to churches as 
opposed to all 501(c)(3)s, the IRS has had to determine what quali-
fies as a "church" for these purposes. The IRS uses a fourteen-factor 
test, although an organization does not have to satisfy all fourteen 
factors to qualify.148 The courts have used this test and also an "as-
sociational test" that considers whether the organization has a 
143. See id.§§ 511-514. 
144. See id.§§ 170(a), (c)(2), 2055 (a)(2), 2522(a)(2). 
145. See id.§ 3306(c)(8). 
146. See id.§§ 508(c)(l)(A), 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), 7611. 
147. See id. § 107. This cash compensation aspect of the ministerial housing benefit 
was recently the subject of an ultimately unsuccessful constitutional challenge. See infra 
note 180. Other special tax benefits for churches and ministers relate to retirement plans 
and payroll taxes. See I.RC. §§ 410(c)(l)(B), 411(e)(l)(B), 412(e)(2)(D), 414(c)(2), (e), 
1402(a)(8), (e) (2018). 
148. See Spiritual Outreach Soc'y v. Comm'r, 927 F.2d 335,338 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Remarks of IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz, PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax 
Planning Gan. 9, 1978), reprinted in Fed. Taxes (P-H) 'l[ 54,820 (1978)); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 88-33-001 (May 2, 1988); I.RS. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977); INTERNAL 
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group of individuals that meets regularly for worship and other re-
ligious purposes.149 The relative vagueness of both tests is driven in 
significant part by the need to accommodate "churches" of all faiths 
or even of arguably none.150 
2. State and Local Tax Law 
States and localities of course also impose a variety of taxes, in-
cluding income, property, and sales and use taxes. In general, most 
5O1(c)(3)s qualify for exemption from these taxes in most states and 
localities, including almost always churches, although the scope 
and conditions related to them vary widely.151 However and in 
common with other 5O1(c)(3)s, churches often do not qualify for ex-
emption from levies that are characterized as user fees or similarly 
tied to the provision of particular services, such as trash collec-
tion.1s2 
REVENUE SERV., "CHURCHES" DEFINED, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-prof-
its/churches-religious-organizations/churches-defined [https:/ /perma.cc/9EG7-A UQ4]. 
The IRS first faced the difficult task of determining what constituted a church when 
Congress initially enacted the unrelated business income tax, which in its original form, 
exempted churches (and conventions and associations of churches) from this tax. See, 
e.g., Maggie Flynn, Witchcraft and Tax Exempt Status Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 763, 788 (1987); Schwarz, supra note 43, at 64-67; Wendy 
Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PIIT. L. REV. 345, 350-51 
(1990); Bruce Nevin Shortt, The Establishment Clause and Religion-Based Categories: Taking 
Entanglement Seriously, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145, 166--67 (1982). 
149. See Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 614 F.3d 1383, 1388-89 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
150. See Wash. Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957); 
Washington Ethical Society, GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org/profile/52-0796318 
[https://perma.cc/QEN2-547C]. 
151. See Mark J. Cowan, Nonprofits and the Sales and Use Tax, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1077, 
1096 (sales and use tax), 1184-86 (property tax) (2010); John L. Mikesell, State Retail Sales 
Tax Treatment of Nonprofits, 64 EXEMIT ORG. TAX REV. 37, 41-42, 44-45 (2009); 50-State 
Chart of Nonprofit State Tax Exemptions, NONPROFIT STARTUP GUIDE, https://www.har-
borcompliance.com/information/nonprofit-income-sales-use-tax-exemptions-by-state 
[https://perma.cc/6ERM-G4ETI. 
152. See DAPHNE A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, THE PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION 
FOR NONPROFITS AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS FOR CmES 5--6 (2011), https://www.ur-
ban.org/research/publication/property-tax-exemption-nonprofits-and-revenue-impli-
cations-cities/view /full_report. (https:/ /perma.cc/3DUG-YZGF]. 
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B. Constitutional Reasons for Tax Benefits 
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "153 The ap-
plication of this provision to taxation of churches is far from clear. 
Both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause have 
been invoked to support exempting churches from taxation and 
other tax benefits, while the Establishment Clause has also been in-
voked as a basis for holding such benefits invalid.154 This Part con-
siders each clause in tum. 
1. Free Exercise Clause 
The Free Exercise Clause argument is that the taxation of a 
church's income would place a substantial burden on the exercise 
of religion both by directly reducing the financial resources of the 
church and by imposing other costs on the church, including ad-
ministrative costs and potential chilling effects. 155 The argument 
can also be extended to the taxation of funds provided by donors 
to the church (if such donors are not permitted to deduct their con-
tributions), although it is obviously weaker in that context, and to 
some if not all of the other tax benefits enjoyed by churches at both 
the federal and state levels.156 The counterargument is that a mere 
reduction in financial resources that is not targeted at churches but 
instead is generally applicable to all organizations is not a substan-
tial burden on the exercise of religion, and that even if it were it is 
more than justified by the revenue needs of the state.157 
153. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
154. See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 55-56 (summarizing but not endorsing this 
argument); Christine Roemhildt Moore, Comment, Religious Tax Exemption and the 
"Charitable Scrutiny" Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 308--09 (2002) (same). 
156. See, e.g., J. Michael Martin, Should the Government Be in the Business of Taxing 
Churches?, 29 REGENTU. L. REV. 309, 321-22 (2017). 
157. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Legal Theories of Tax Exemption: A Sovereignty Perspective, 
in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 145, 160 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002) [herein-
after Brody, Legal Theories]; Simon, supra note 64, at 505-07; see also Hernandez v. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts have favored the counterargu-
ment even though they have not squarely ruled in its favor with 
respect to churches.158 Even before the Supreme Court decided in 
Employment Division v. Smith159 that the Free Exercise Clause does 
not provide a defense for violations of neutral laws of general ap-
plicability, the Court repeatedly denied free exercise claims that 
sought exemptions from generally applicable taxes.16° For example, 
in United States v. Lee,161 the Supreme Court refused to exempt an 
Amish employer from paying Social Security taxes-to which he 
objected on religious grounds-because of the government's com-
pelling interest in the uniform application of the social security tax 
systern.162 And as already noted, the Court in Bob Jones University 
rejected the claim that the Free Exercise Clause barred the federal 
government from revoking the tax benefits enjoyed by the religious 
schools involved.163 In addition, attempts by religious organizations 
to challenge other conditions on tax exemption relating to political 
activity based on the Free Exercise Clause have failed in federal ap-
pellate courts.164 The courts have also rejected Free Exercise Clause 
challenges to other requirements for Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status.165 The only exceptions appear to be when the tax at issue is 
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (suggesting without deciding that a denial of a chari-
table contribution deduction for a payment to a church may not place a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion). 
158. See, e.g., Dessingue, supra note 139, at 177-78; Moore, supra note 155, at 309-11. 
159. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
160. Id. at 885. 
161. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
162. Id. at 258-59; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 
378, 392 (1990) (concluding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require a state to 
grant an exemption to a religious organization from the collection and payment of a 
generally applicable sales tax); Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700 (citing Lee in rejecting a 
free exercise challenge to the disallowance of a charitable contribution deduction for 
certain payments to a church); Thomas, supra note 56, at 612-13 (discussing Lee). 
163. See supra Part I.A. 
164. E.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142-44 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Chris-
tian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1972); see also 
Schwarz, supra note 43, at 73-80 (discussing Christian Echoes Nat'/ Ministry). 
165. E.g., Parker v. Comm'r, 365 F.2d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 1966); Church of Scientology 
v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 381, 458-60 (1984), aff d 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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effectively a prior restraint on religious activity, 166 intentionally tar-
gets disfavored religious practices, 167 or is so draconian as to have a 
prohibitory effect.168 
The position that the courts have taken with respect to Free Exer-
cise Clause claims relating to taxation is the correct one, regardless 
of whether that conclusion is reached using the reasoning in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith or a strict scrutiny analysis. Even assum-
ing that taxation by itself imposes a substantial burden on religious 
exercise-which is debatable-the imposition of generally applica-
ble tax laws in a neutral manner to churches is narrowly tailored to 
further the government's compelling interest in collecting sufficient 
revenue in an efficient and uniform manner. Merely invoking the 
famous quotation that "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy" is not enough to counter this argument if the tax law at issue 
is reasonable in amount and generally applicable; as the quoted 
source goes on to correctly state, "Taxation ... does not necessarily 
and unavoidably destroy."169 
2. Establishment Clause 
The Establishment Clause's application is trickier, in part because 
it can reasonably be invoked to both support and oppose tax bene-
fits for churches. Some commentators argue that since the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits governments not only from favoring par-
ticular faiths but also from favoring religion generally over non-
religion, providing tax benefits to religious organizations is uncon-
stitutional.170 Some argue instead or in addition that such exemp-
tions raise significant entanglement concerns, including those 
caused by having to determine what constitutes a "religion" or a 
166. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389; Dessingue, supra note 139, at 177-
78. 
167. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,546 (1993). 
168. See Kenneth C. Halcom, Taxing God, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 729, 751-52 (2007). 
169. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,431 (1819); see also Halcom, supra note 168, 
at 749 (making this same point). 
170. See, e.g., Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 600 (1990). 
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"church," that render them unconstitutional.171 In their view the 
benefits provided to churches only are even more vulnerable to an 
Establishment Clause challenge because they are not available to 
any other tax-exempt nonprofits.172 
Supporters of the tax benefits for churches have in tum argued 
that the Establishment Clause requires those benefits because oth-
erwise the government would become excessively entangled in the 
internal affairs of churches.173 Their case is strongest in the income 
tax exemption context, where determining the taxable income of a 
church would require difficult decisions on both the income side -
for example, are donations to a church excluded from gross income 
as "gifts" in all situations, or only when they are not motivated 
(compelled?) by a perceived religious obligation-and the deduc-
tion side-for example, normally only expenses incurred to gener-
ate income are deductible, so it is unclear what expenses incurred 
by a church would be deductible other than fundraising costs and 
investment fees. 174 Other tax contexts raise less significant entangle-
ment concerns because, for example, the application of sales and 
use tax to purchases or sales by a church requires little involvement 
in the church's internal affairs; while property taxes could raise dif-
ficult valuation issues for church buildings, 175 such taxes again do 
not require much if any involvement in a church's internal affairs. 
At the same time, exemptions and other tax benefits are not free 
from entanglement concerns, in large part because of the need to 
determine which organizations qualify for the tax benefit at issue. 
171. See, e.g., Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the 
Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 855, 900-01 (1993); Shortt, supra note 148, at 146, 182, 185. But see Erika King, Tax 
Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 1010-14 (1999) (reject-
ing this argument). 
172. See, e.g., Shaller, supra note 148, at 360-61; West, supra note 170, at 610. 
173. See, e.g., Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal 
Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 112-13 (1991); 
Thomas, supra note 56, at 627-30. 
174. See Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1298-
1300 (1969). 
175. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid 
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363,410 (1991). 
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The courts have walked a careful line in this area. In Walz v. Tax 
Commission, 176 the Supreme Court determined that when a tax ben-
efit is generally available to a broad range of organizations, includ-
ing but not limited to churches and other religious organizations, 
and so not intended to advance religion specifically, and also does 
not have the effect of excessively entangling government with reli-
gion, then it is permissible under the Establishment Clause.177 While 
that decision concerned a property tax exemption, commentators 
and lower courts have generally seen its reasoning as applying in 
other tax contexts, including income taxes.178 At the same time, in 
one instance when a tax benefit was made available only with re-
spect to a religious activity, the Supreme Court found that the ben-
efit violated the Establishment Clause by favoring religious activity 
over non-religious activity.179 Relying on the latter case, a federal 
district court recently found the federal income tax exemption for 
cash payments used for ministerial housing violated the Establish-
ment Clause, although an appellate court reversed that decision.180 
The plaintiffs did not seek Supreme Court review, 181 so it is still pos-
sible, although unlikely, that the Supreme Court might conclude 
this tax benefit is unconstitutional in a future case. If that were to 
occur, there likely would be other successful Establishment Clause 
challenges to church and minister-specific tax benefits. 
Professor Edward Zelinsky has comprehensively considered 
these Establishment Clause issues in a book-length analysis that we 
176. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
177. Id. at 672-73, 675-76 (1970). 
178. See generally King, supra note 171. 
179. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion), 
28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
180. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017), rev'd, 919 
F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019). In the interests of full disclosure, on appeal one of the authors 
signed an amicus curiae brief in this case arguing that this tax benefit does not violate 
the Establishment Clause. 
181. Atheists Give up $1B Church Tax Lawsuit, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIG. LIB., 
https://www.becketlaw.org/media/atheists-give-lb-church-tax-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/75S7-K85R]. 
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will not attempt to replicate in detail here.182 Suffice it to say that he 
is correct that entanglement concerns arise both when generally ap-
plicable tax laws apply (which he calls "enforcement entangle-
ment") and when churches are granted exemptions to such laws 
(which he calls "borderline entanglement") and that therefore the 
Establishment Clause does not render any such benefits unconsti-
tutional.183 While some would go further than Professor Zelinsky 
and argue that the Establishment Clause requires exemption from 
at least federal and state income taxes in most situations,184 there is 
little indication that the courts are open to such an argument.185 Un-
der any conditions, accepting this extension is not necessary for re-
solving how Bob Jones University should apply to churches. Instead, 
it is sufficient to conclude that such benefits are constitutionally 
permissible, as the Supreme Court held with respect to the property 
tax exemption at issue in Walz. 186 
C. Policy Reasons for Tax Benefits 
The existence of these many tax benefits naturally raises the ques-
tion of why churches should receive them if they are not constitu-
tionally required. Governments, academics, and others have pro-
vided numerous justifications for these benefits.187 Critics of these 
benefits have also marshalled arguments for why churches should 
not enjoy them, whether in part or in whole.188 This Part considers 
the historical but no longer applicable reasons, the commonly as-
serted quid pro quo rationale, and finally an autonomy or "soft sov-
ereignty" approach, which we adopt. 
182. See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH: RELIGION, EXEMPTIONS, ENTAN-
GLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2017). 
183. See id. at xv, xvii. 
184. See, e.g., Halcom, supra note 168, at 756, 760-62, 765-66. 
185. See ZELINSKY, supra note 182, at 23. 
186. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970). 
187. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The "Independent" Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the 
Limits of Autonomy, 65 V AND. L. REV. 49, 64-69 (2012) (summarizing justifications); 
McCormack, supra note 67, at 984-989 (same). 
188. See infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text. 
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1. Historical Reasons: Hard Sovereignty or 
Arm of the State 
Churches (and often their leaders) have enjoyed tax exemptions 
and other tax benefits for thousands of years.189 One possible reason 
for the earliest examples is what could fairly be characterized as a 
"strong sovereignty" justification - churches and their leaders are 
not answerable to the state, but to a separate (and powerful) sover-
eign (whether God or gods), and so should not be subject to tax by 
the state.190 At a more practical level, this justification may be re-
lated to the fact that religious institutions and their leaders often 
constituted a separate source of significant political power that 
could and would resist, likely successfully and perhaps violently, 
any attempts by the state to tax them.191 However, this justification 
no longer holds sway either at the theoretical or the practical level 
in the United States, where the federal and state governments are 
now the only legally recognized sovereigns192 (other than Native 
American tribes in some respects193). 
A more well documented historical reason for providing tax ben-
efits to some but not all churches is when the state has established 
a state church.194 In that situation, tax benefits are justified because 
the state church is an arm of the government and so, like govern-
ment agencies, is not subject to taxation.195 In the past this also often 
189. See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 139, at 71 n.1; John W. Whitehead, Tax Ex-
emption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 522-
31 (1991). 
190. See, e.g., Halcom, supra note 168, at 736-37. 
191. See, e.g., King, supra note 191, at 973-75. 
192. Halcom, supra note 168, at 748; Thomas, supra note 56, at 610-11. See also MARC 
0. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 191-93 (2013) (aspects of reli-
gious establishment continued in the United States until at least the 1940s). 
193. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW§§ 4.01--4.07 (2012 ed.). 
194. Halcom, supra note 168, at 737. 
195. See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 139, at 75-76; WILLIAM GEORGE TORPEY, 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 171 (1948); Halcom, supra note 
168, at 737; Witte, supra note 175, at 374-75; Carl Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American 
Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REV. 646, 648 (1915); Christine Roemhildt Moore, Note, 
Religious Tax Exemption and the Charitable Scrutiny Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295, 298-
99 (2002). 
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meant that churches from other faiths enjoyed only the tax benefits 
available to charitable entities but not those limited to the estab-
lished state church, but over time governments have usually ex-
tended the tax benefits the state religion historically enjoyed to 
other faiths. 196 Often governments may have done so out of a vague 
idea of fairness or in the face of political pressure without much 
apparent consideration of why these benefits should extend to pri-
vate entities that are not arms of the state.197 Of course, the United 
States has never had a national church and the states that did have 
a state church no longer do, so this arm of the state justification also 
no longer applies.198 
2. Quid Pro Quo 
Given that neither a strong sovereignty nor an arm of the state 
justification applies in the United States, the most commonly cited 
modem justification is a quid pro quo one.199 Applied not only to 
churches but to all 501(c)(3)s, this justification is essentially that the 
societal benefits provided by these organizations, including but not 
limited to the provision of services that governments would other-
wise provide, exceed the societal costs of the tax benefits they en-
joy .200 More sophisticated versions of this argument include eco-
nomic theories that assert certain societally beneficial goods and 
196. See Witte, supra note 175, at 379-80. 
197. See id. Indeed, according to Professor John Witte, the disappearance of state 
churches in the United States led to the first significant criticism of tax exemptions for 
churches in the 1810s. Witte, supra note 175, at 381. 
198. See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 192, at 191; King, supra note 191, at 977-78; Shortt, 
supra note 148, at 161-62; Zollman, supra note 195, at 648-49. 
199. See, e.g., EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 246 
(1974); TORPEY, supra note 195, at 172; Zollman, supra note 195, at 64647; Dessingue, 
supra note 139, at 174-75; Halcom, supra note 168, at 740; King, supra note 191, at 981; 
Witte, supra note 175, at 387. This rationale is not purely modem, however, as it can be 
traced back to at least the English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601. See CRIMM & 
WINER, supra note 139, at 76-77; Halcom, supra note 168, at 738; Witte, supra note 175, 
at375-76. 
200. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 55; Moore, supra note 195, at 296-97; see also 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589-92 (1983) (arguing that charitable 
exemptions are justified by the public benefit provided by the exempt entity). But see 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397U.S. 664,674 (1970) ("We find it unnecessary to justify the tax 
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services would be provided at a suboptimal level absent the sup-
port provided to 501(c)(3)s through these tax benefits201 and politi-
cal science theories that emphasize the pluralism benefits created 
through this support of 501(c)(3)s.202 Although a separate set of 
modem theories relies on "tax base" arguments that the net income 
(or property, or sales by, or purchases by) of either churches specif-
ically or charities generally is not part of the base of the tax under 
consideration when properly theorized, these theories are less fa-
vored, have acknowledged gaps, and perhaps most importantly, 
have not had any traction with the courts.203 
One potential difficulty with this quid pro quo justification as ap-
plied to churches is that some commentators contest whether and 
to what extent churches provide societal benefits, both generally 
and in specific instances.204 The severest critics of tax benefits for 
churches usually view the societal benefits they provide as minimal 
or nonexistent, dismissing most churches as no more than social 
clubs for their members.205 While even these critics acknowledge 
that some churches provide beneficial services, such as soup kitch-
ens or homeless shelters, their view is that these activities could and 
exemption on the social welfare services or 'good works' that some churches perform 
for parishioners and others."). 
201. See generally John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treat-
ment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
267, 274-75 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
202. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56; Terry L. Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar: De-
fining "Religion" for Purposes of Administering Religious-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219,249 (1983); Moore, supra note 195, at 297; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 
689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the unique contribution of religious organ-
izations to pluralism). 
203. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,544 (1983) 
(stating that, in case involving whether a nonprofit qualified for tax benefits, "[b]oth 
tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy"); Bittker, supra note 174, at 
1288-92 (applying these tax base theories to churches); Mayer, supra note 187, at 64-65 
(summarizing these theories and their flaws); Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56-57 (apply-
ing these theories to churches and identifying issues when doing so). 
204. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 43, at 55. 
205. See, e.g., Miranda Fleischer, Churches Are More Private Club than Public Good. Why 
Do They Need Tax Exemptions?, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/17/churches-are-more-club-than-public-
good-why-do-they-need-tax-exemptions/ [https:/ /perma.cc/9MY 6-MKZC]. 
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should be required to be spun off into separate legal entities to en-
joy their justified tax benefits, while stripping those benefits from 
churches. 206 
Supporters of tax benefits for churches that rely on this justifica-
tion have a very different view of the effect of churches on society. 
They argue that churches, at least in the aggregate, provide numer-
ous benefits to society.207 These benefits include not only concrete 
goods and services such as feeding the poor but also more difficult 
to measure but no less real benefits, such as moral instruction, cul-
tivation of public spiritedness, and fostering of democratic princi-
ples. 208 And these benefits redound not only to individuals in-
volved with churches but society more generally.209 
3. Autonomy (or Soft Sovereignty) 
Professor Evelyn Brody has identified, but not endorsed, a "soft 
sovereignty" approach that may explain in large part the tax ex-
emptions enjoyed by charities, based on the notion that taxation of 
at least some types of private organizations should be limited out 
of recognition that there are spheres of society that should be 
mostly beyond the state's authority.210 Focusing on churches specif-
ically, adopting this approach leads to a right of churches to enjoy 
206. See, e.g., Mark Oppenheimer, Now's the Time To End Tax Exemptions For Religions 
Institutions, TIME Gune 28, 2015, 11:16 AM), https://tirne.com/3939143/nows-the-tirne-
to-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/E64K-X3MT]; Edi-
torial, Churches Should Pay Taxes!, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 9, 1947, reprinted in 
THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY READER 327, 328 (Harold E. Fey & Margaret Frakes eds., 
1962). 
207. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 1352-55; Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56 (summa-
rizing this argument without endorsing it); Witte, supra note 175, at 387-88; Zollman, 
supra note 195, at 647 (summarizing this argument without endorsing it). For argu-
ments that religion is distinctive and so deserves special legal protection, see generally 
KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTNENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RETHINK-
ING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (2015); Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special 
Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 493-500 (2017). 
208. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 1352-55; Schwarz, supra note 43, at 56 (summa-
rizing this argument without endorsing it). 
209. Witte, supra note 175, at 387. 
210. Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemp-
tion, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 587-89 (1998); Legal Theories at 151-53; see also Mayer, supra note 
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autonomy in most situations, including with respect to finances.211 
Taxing churches risks violating this autonomy because it neces-
sarily requires the state to become involved in the financial affairs 
of churches, although the extent of that involvement will vary de-
pending on the type of tax and the type of tax benefit involved. 
This autonomy or soft sovereignty justification arises from the 
view that, in any society where the state is not all encompassing, 
there necessarily are areas that should be free from state oversight 
and interference.212 Churches have a particularly strong argument 
for being such an area, at least with respect to their internal af-
fairs. 213 That is because they provide an institutional setting for peo-
ple who share a faith to practice that faith, to interact in ways de-
signed to promote understanding and promulgation of that faith, 
and to consider how their faith should affect their lives outside of 
the church setting.214 In other words, it is religiously significant ac-
tivities that are protected, as Professor Laycock notes.215 Any state 
involvement with the internal affairs of churches risks disrupting 
these important, private activities, particularly given both the 
power of the state and the fact that the state's views will almost 
certainly conflict with at least some of the teachings of most 
faiths.216 Some commentators also find a legal basis for this justifi-
cation in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.217 The next 
203, at 70-71 (proposing an autonomy perspective for evaluating the legal rules relating 
to charities). 
211. E.g., Brunson & Herzig, supra note 33, at 1202--03; Martin, supra note 156, at 309; 
see also IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 
43-44 (2014) (describing the broader debate over church autonomy). 
212. See Brody, supra note 210, at 588. 
213. Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 253, 267 
(2009). 
214. See Lund, supra note 207, at 490-91. 
215. Laycock, supra note 213, at 267--68; see also DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES 
SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 41 (1977) ( characterizing churches as "the central repositories 
of religious activity, from which may flow many kinds of partial or peripheral religious 
interests or ministrations"). 
216. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 1341--43. 
217. See Richard W. Garnett, Why churches shouldn't have to pay taxes, U.S. CATHOLIC 
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.uscatholic.org/articles/201610/why-churches-shouldnt-
have-pay-taxes-30799 [https://perma.cc/XHQ8-47FQ]; supra Part III.B. 
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Part therefore focuses on this approach, exploring the philosophical 
and legal bases for it. 
IV. WHY THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT SHOULD CONTROL 
The idea that the First Amendment-Religion Clauses in-
cluded-protects institutions as well as individuals has gained 
steam in recent years.218 In regard to churches specifically, the "soft 
sovereignty" approach described above lines up nicely with the 
idea that churches, as First Amendment institutions, should be af-
forded autonomy regarding their internal doctrines and practices. 
Under the First Amendment institutions theory, churches and other 
institutions that participate in activities like speech and religion 
should be afforded First Amendment protections as institutions. 
This Part first provides a more in-depth treatment of the soft sover-
eignty approach in light of the philosophical idea of "sphere sover-
eignty" and then unites it with the legal idea of First Amendment 
institutions and applies that understanding in the context of tax 
benefits. This Part concludes by distinguishing and defining 
churches-both as a theoretical underpinning and legal necessity. 
A. Sphere Sovereignty 
1. The Theory 
The soft sovereignty approach is illuminated by the work of the 
nineteenth-century neo-Calvinist writer and former Prime Minister 
of the Netherlands Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper proposed that church 
and state interact and coexist with each other according to his the-
ory of sphere sovereignty.219 Spheres are social institutions in which 
"authority structures specific to those spheres emerge."220 Sover-
eignty is the idea that spheres have a natural right to form both the 
218. See infra Part IV.B. 
219. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Abraham Kuyper on the Limited Authority of Church and 
State, 7 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 105, 108--13 (2009). 
220. Id. at 110. 
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sphere itself and the authority structure that governs it.221 Thus, 
sphere sovereignty is the idea that certain social institutions should 
enjoy a degree of autonomy within their own domains. 
First, we must break down Kuyper's conception of a "sphere." 
For Kuyper, the four main spheres are the State, Society, the 
Church, and the Individual.222 This Article focuses primarily on the 
first three. Within society are social spheres, which encompass all 
aspects of life and include "the family, the business, science, art and 
so forth." 223 Thus, in this respect, a church can be thought of as a 
social sphere, though there are important distinctions between the 
two.224 Kuyper describes the sphere-forming process for non-state 
spheres as "organic."225 People arrange themselves based on shared 
interests or localities pursuant to natural forces of human nature.226 
Such arrangements are "natural" because forming them does not 
require approval by a church, the state, or any other social sphere.227 
The state, conversely, is of a "mechanical" nature.228 Unlike social 
spheres, which are formed in a bottom-up fashion, states operate 
from top-down.229 Whereas daily activities occupy the spaces of so-
cial spheres, the state qua sphere is a "means of compelling order 
and of guaranteeing a safe course of life."230 Put simply, the state is 
the "sphere of spheres, which encircles the whole extent of human 
life."231 The authority and responsibility inherent to each kind of 
sphere-social versus state-flow from these differences.232 
221. Id.; see also ABRAHAM KUYPER, CALVINISM: SIX LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE THE-
OLOGICAL SEMINARY AT PRINCETON 121 (New York, Revell 1899) (" And in both these 
spheres[, social and state,] the inherent authority is sovereign, that is to say, it has above 
itself nothing but God."). 
222. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 99, 139. 
223. Id. at 116. 
224. See infra Part IV.C.l. 
225. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 115. 
226. Id. at 116-17. 
227. Id. at 110. 
228. Id. at 116-17. 
229. Id. at 115. 
230. Id. at 101. 
231. ABRAHAM KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, in ABRAHAM KUYPER: A CENTENNIAL 
READER 461, 472 Games D. Bratt ed., 1998). 
232. See Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 109-10. 
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Second, we must understand what Kuyper meant by "sover-
eignty." In the organic development of social spheres, authority 
structures emerge by which someone "either in his own person or 
acting in the name of the institution ... issue[ s] directives to others 
that place those others under the (prima fade) obligation to 
obey."233 Each sphere thus develops an authority structure specific 
to its needs.234 Besides the state itself,235 spheres do not derive their 
internal authority from anything or anyone outside of themselves, 
but it is, rather, "original to them."236 And importantly, this inher-
ent ability of a sphere to define the parameters of its internal au-
thority-that is, its "sovereignty" -is not only a descriptive ac-
count but a normative one: social spheres have a natural right to 
organize and to govern themselves.237 These concepts are not 
unique to Kuyper; for example, Professor Victor Muiiiz-Fraticelli's 
conception of sovereignty provides an independent source of legit-
imacy for institutions based on the concurrence of their members 
and allows institutions to pursue their collective values without 
first obtaining permission from another authority.238 
Kuyper' s approach to sovereignty also requires consideration of 
the authority a sphere-be it a social sphere or the state-has over 
other spheres. Because a sphere's sovereignty is natural to it, each 
institution represents a "truly sovereign sphere[], which may not 
lightly be interfered with by any other sovereign."239 Kuyper' s fo-
cus on autonomy is not only a recognition that spheres are free to 
organize self-governing structures, but also that they are free from 
outside interference in their development and self-determination.240 
233. Id. at 109. 
234. Id. at 109-10. 
235. See KUYPER, supra note 231, at 110-16 (positing that states derive their political 
authority not from the consent of the governed but from the grace of God). 
236. Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 110. 
237. Id.; see also KUYPER, supra note 221. 
238. VICTOR MUNIZ-FRATICELLI, THE STRUCTURE OF PLURALISM 101-17 (2014). 
239. Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and 
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 96 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 
240. See Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 112 ("Kuyper thought that in a modem well-
functioning society, the authority of an organization should be limited to activities 
within one particular sphere .... For when an institution comes under the control of 
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Unlike social spheres, which must abide by this "principle of non-
interference," the state has a unique role to play as the sphere of 
spheres.241 Negatively, the state "may never become an octopus, 
which stifles the whole of life" but must "honour and maintain 
every form of life, which grows independently, in its own sacred 
autonomy." 242 But Kuyper also envisioned a positive role for the 
state. The state has the: 
right and duty: l. Whenever different spheres clash, to 
compel mutual regard for the boundary-lines of each; 2. 
To defend individuals and the weak ones, in those 
spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest; and 3. To 
coerce all together to bear personal and financial burdens 
for the maintenance of the natural unity of the State.243 
When it governs within these guidelines, the state acts in accord 
with-but does not exceed the scope of-its sphere sovereignty.244 
But when the state uses its coercive power to control social spheres 
without their invitation -be it through restrictive regulations or 
unequal treatment of similarly situated social spheres-the state ex-
ceeds the scope of its sphere sovereignty.245 
Kuyper envisioned a different role for the social sphere most rel-
evant here: the church. Kuyper taught that, consistent with his the-
ory, no single church should dominate, and, like the state, churches 
cannot intrude outside of their own spheres.246 The latter point im-
plies not only that churches "must stay within their own province," 
but that a church cannot compel membership of persons who 
an institution whose guiding function lies in another sphere, activity within the former 
institution is almost always distorted by this 'outside' control."). See generally Richard 
W. Garnett, The Worms and the Octopus: Religious Freedom, Pluralism, and Conservatism, 
in AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: NOMOS LVI 160 (Sanford V. Levinson et al. eds., 2016) 
(developing this idea). 
241. See Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 114. 




246. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 97. 
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would voluntarily disassociate with said church.247 Positively, a 
strong church sphere in society acts as a II fundamental limit on 
state-aggrandizement.11248 Because churches recognize that their au-
tonomy is ultimately given by God, they are distinguished from 
other social spheres and, due to their unique metaphysical perspec-
tive, are particularly important for the organic development of a 
thriving, pluralist society.249 
The church-state relationship that Kuyper imagined grows out of 
the autonomy inherent to each sphere as well as the respective role 
that each is to play. Describing Kuyper' s theory as creating a society 
of II guided and divided pluralism," one scholar wrote: 
It is guided in that each sphere has 'its own unique set of 
functions and norms,' and all of them are expressions of 
God's ultimate sovereignty. It is divided in that each 
sphere, provided that it acts appropriately, is to remain 
sovereign, untouchable by church, state, or other social 
institutions. 250 
In sum, sphere sovereignty respects the inherent autonomy of pri-
vately and independently organized peoples-that is, social 
spheres. The state, itself a sphere, is tasked with ensuring that or-
ganically created spheres, including churches, continue to have op-
portunities to emerge and to flourish. The relationship between 
church and state under the sphere sovereignty approach thus pro-
vides a helpful starting point by which to approach church-state 
disputes. Moreover, Kuyper' s theory, with its skepticism of outside 
247. Id. at 98. 
248. Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 112. 
249. See infra Part IV.C. 
250. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 98 (quoting Richard J. Mouw, Some Reflections on 
Sphere Sovereignty, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PuBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEG-
ACY FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 100 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 2000)). 
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interference, fits with an American society in which liberty is re-
garded as a most cherished right.251 It also resonates with the Cath-
olic principle of subsidiarity.252 
Prior to discussion of the implications of the sphere sovereignty 
approach for the special tax treatment of churches, we must address 
the following objection: For the non-Christian, does it matter that 
Kuyper was not only a devout Calvinist but that his theory of the 
social structure is explicitly based on Christian ideas? In his appli-
cation of Kuyper' s work to First Amendment institutions, 253 Profes-
sor Paul Horwitz squarely addresses this concern, and his replies 
are also relevant in employing sphere sovereignty as a justification 
for the tax benefits received by churches. Kuyper' s theory, while 
unabashedly Calvinist, need not be tied to Calvinism or any reli-
gious belief system to retain its coherence and internal con-
sistency .254 In fact, scholars who endorse sphere sovereignty have 
argued that sphere sovereignty, even set loose from its Calvinist 
roots, "has much to offer to contemporary discussions of civil soci-
ety."255 For Professor Horwitz, this modernization of sphere sover-
eignty also quells concerns regarding the opposite objection-that 
251. See The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness."); Charles L. Cohen, The "Liberty or Death" Speech: A Note on Religion 
and Revolutionary Rhetoric, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 702 (1981) (giving an historical account 
of Patrick Henry's famous "Give me liberty, or give me death!" speech); see also Charles 
Glenn, CPJ's 2017 Kuyper Lecture, Rediscovering Sphere Sovereignty In The Age of 
Trump (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.cpjustice.org/public/page/con-
tent/2017 _kuyper_lecture_remarks [https://perma.cc/PNX2-CFM7). 
252. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court Justices: A Theo-
logical Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296, 304-06 (2006); Horwitz, supra note 239, at 105; 
PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE 
OF THE CHURCH 'l['l[ 185-88 (2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifi-
ca1_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-
soc_en.html [https://perma.ccN6CP-VWGQ] (the principle of subsidiarity). 
253. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 91-99. 
254. See id. at 93-94. 
255. Richard J. Mouw, Culture, Church, and Civil Society: Kuyper for a New Century, 28 
PRINCETON SEMINARY BULL. 48, 55 (2007); see also Horwitz, supra note 239, at 93-94; 
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to separate sphere sovereignty from Calvinism robs the theory of 
its force.256 Rather than break down each aspect of Kuyper's theory 
and test its secular strength, this Article simply does not rely upon 
those aspects of sphere sovereignty that are uniquely Calvinist (and 
has not thus far). Thus, sphere sovereignty remains a helpful theo-
retical framework for thinking about the relationship between 
church and state in a modem, pluralist society.257 
However, because Kuyper is not king, the interplay between his 
theory and the effects that it has had on American legal thought are 
useful considerations before applying his metaphor in the modem 
tax benefits context.258 Some of the Founders-Thomas Jefferson, 
John Adams, and James Madison among them-were influenced 
by the early settlers' Puritan views on the roles of the state and 
churches within society, views that parallel Kuyper's later work.259 
The Calvinist doctrine of covenant gave rise to the Puritan belief 
that church and state were "two separate covenantal associations, 
two coordinate seats of godly authority and power in society."260 
Inspired by this Puritan-influenced approach to pluralism, in his 
drafting of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, John Adams 
"guaranteed churches the right to select their own ministers with-
out state interference, a right that is consistent with the concept of 
Johan D. Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious Institutions: A Contemporary Cal-
vinistic Theory Of Church-State Relations, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SUR-
VEY (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001). 
256. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 93-94. See generally Mark Tushnet, Distinctively Chris-
tian Perspectives on Legal Thought?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1858 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (2001)) (discussing in general the application of 
"Christian" ideas to secular legal debates). But see George Harinck, A Historian's Com-
ment on the Use of Abraham Kuyper's Idea of Sphere Sovereignty, 5 J. MARKETS & MORALITY 
277 (2002) (arguing that sphere sovereignty is a credo that cannot be separated from its 
religious roots). 
257. See Horwitz, supra note 239, at 93-94. 
258. For a deeper discussion of the effects of sphere sovereignty on the American 
constitutional structure, see generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITU-
TIONS 179-82 (2013). 
259. Horwitz, supra note 239 at 100-01. 
260. JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 309 (2007). 
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sphere sovereignty."261 The early constitutions of Connecticut, 
Maine, and New Hampshire had similar provisions.262 
Moreover, Professor Philip Hamburger observes that even late 
eighteenth-century Americans who supported religious exemp-
tions would not have argued for a constitutional right to exemp-
tions because, at the time, "the jurisdiction of civil government and 
the authority of religion were frequently considered distinguisha-
ble."263 No exemptions were necessary since "Congress shall make 
no law"264 infringing upon the free exercise of religion, which "as-
sumes Congress can avoid enacting laws that prohibit free exer-
cise" in the first place.265 Likewise, Alexis de Tocqueville's descrip-
tion of the nineteenth-century interaction between church and state 
in America was one that tracks the normative account later prof-
fered by Kuyper.266 Professor Horwitz notes that "Tocqueville saw 
evidence in nineteenth-century America that the Calvinist Puritan 
ideal had taken root: in Kuyper' s words, America had embraced a 
pluralistic system whose watchword was '[a] free Church in a free 
State."'267 These historical examples, as well as later philosophical 
trends that likewise track sphere sovereignty, lead Professor Hor-
witz to conclude that there is at least "the possibility that the ideas 
underlying sphere sovereignty are not alien but immanent in the 
American social and constitutional order."268 As such, Professor 
Horwitz concludes that real consideration ought to be given to 
"how sphere sovereignty might be said to shape that order" and 
how it might affect First Amendment issues.269 
We do not mean to overstate the influence that Kuyper's theory 
of sphere sovereignty had on the American Founding, nor do we 
261. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 102. 
262. See id. 
263. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 936-37 (1992). 
264. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
265. Hamburger, supra note 263, at 938. 
266. Horwitz, supra note 239, at 103. 
267. Id. at 103 (quoting KUYPER, supra note 221, at 128). 
268. Id. at 107. 
269. Id. 
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mean to claim that it has extensive ongoing political influence. In-
deed, Professor Horwitz makes a humble claim: it is possible that 
sphere-sovereignty-inspired thought influenced developments in 
American religious liberty law.270 Regardless, sphere sovereignty as 
both a descriptive and normative concept is a useful tool for think-
ing about current and future First Amendment conflicts and pro-
vides at least a framework for explaining and justifying the unique 
place in society that churches occupy. At its simplest, sphere sover-
eignty is a way of illustrating the idea that churches "should gener-
ally be treated as sovereign, or autonomous, within their individual 
spheres [and should] coexist alongside the state ... serving a vital 
role in furthering self-fulfillment, the development of a religious 
community, and the development of public discourse."271 Sphere 
sovereignty therefore paints a specific picture and fills in some of 
the philosophical gaps as to how such a pluralistic society ought to 
operate. This Part, while it treats sphere sovereignty as a serious 
theory, recognizes that it is not constitutionalized by the First 
Amendment but serves as a theoretical framework for illustrating 
the relationship between church and state in America so as to fur-
ther explain the tax benefits that churches receive. 
2. Possible Objections 
Some scholars nonetheless reject the use of this sphere sover-
eignty approach to justify the (legal) autonomy of churches. In one 
of the more extensive critiques of church autonomy and religious 
institutionalism, Professors Richard Schragger and Micah 
Schwartzman make essentially four claims: (1) that the historical 
account of religious liberty that supports church autonomy is inac-
curate; (2) that church autonomy is anti-republican; (3) that church 
autonomy justifications have no limiting principles; and (4) that 
churches cannot be distinguished from secular groups.272 As this 
Part details, their anti-republican and lack of limiting principles 
270. See id. at 105. 
271. Id. at 114. 
272. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 
VA. L. REV. 917, 932 (2013). 
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charges are unpersuasive on their own terms. We will address their 
church non-distinguishability argument in a later Part.273 Finally, 
their historical argument is largely levied against those who defend 
modem-day church autonomy based on certain eleventh century 
church-state events, 274 which we do not rely on. 
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman argue that church sov-
ereignty is anti-republican because "[i]nstitutions that purport to 
play a special or outsized role in society should be democratically 
accountable. The exercise of public power, of territoriality, of juris-
diction, demands democracy."275 And because churches are not 
democratically accountable, they have instead justified exercises of 
sovereignty by expanding Thomas Paine's "church of one" in an 
attempt to "infuse the institutional church with all the moral au-
thority and independence of the autonomous self ."276 Churches 
must therefore justify their authority in terms of conscience, not 
sovereignty, because "mediating institutions no longer exercise 
government power ... [which is] a product of republican political 
theory."277 
They also make a related argument that the public-private dis-
tinction upon which sphere theorists rely is untenable for churches 
to support in light of their inability to distinguish themselves from 
non-religious private institutions.278 Where the liberal distinction 
between state and individual collapses as churches are afforded 
sovereignty, which, in their view, is ultimately founded upon the 
individual right of conscience, the public-private distinction must 
be replaced with something else to maintain the view that churches 
occupy a unique sphere of sovereignty. Thus, they argue, churches 
fall back on the church-state distinction-but "determining what is 
a church is no more tractable than determining what is a religion, 
273. See infra Part IV.C. For an institutional critique of Professors Schragger and 
Schwartzman's article, see Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. 
L. REV. 1049 (2013). 
274. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 933--37. 
275. Id. at 944. 
276. Id. at 943. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 944. 
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or what is private and what is public."279 Because this argument 
largely bleeds into their critique of the indistinguishability of 
churches from secular groups, we address it in our later Part on that 
issue.280 
Government power is distinct from sovereignty, however, and 
no church situated within an otherwise democratic society would 
have a valid claim to exercising the government's power. Church 
autonomy stands for the proposition that-within its own sphere-
the church may exercise sovereign control. Insofar as "[r]epublican-
ism demands that the people ... constitute the sovereign,"281 some 
churches are not republican - but such churches would not claim 
to be so in the first place. The sovereignty of many churches is un-
derstood not to derive from the people but from a higher power. 
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman further argue that republi-
canism "does not tolerate corporate entities[, including churches,] 
that operate outside of and in defiance of the state."282 As a matter 
of liberal political theory, this assertion is far from settled.283 But 
even accepting the proposition as true, if "defiance of the state" 
means violating-to borrow a constitutional term-a "neutral law 
of general applicability," 284 then the soft sovereignty approach we 
advance here accommodates that restriction insofar as the law is 
criminal in nature.285 The government is without authority, how-
ever, to act beyond its own laws-that is, to exceed its sovereign 
sphere-in controlling the beliefs or practices of churches. 
279. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 944. 
280. See infra Part IV.C. 
281. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 943. 
282. ld. 
283. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 63 (1999) ( arguing that liberal, democratic 
societies must treat as equals "decent hierarchical peoples," that is, nondemocratic so-
cieties that respect basic human rights, even if its members are not guaranteed freedom 
and equality). 
284. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
285. See infra Part V.C. 
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Moreover, if Professors Schragger and Schwartzman mean to 
suggest that churches themselves ought to abide by a democrati-
cally elected hierarchy to gamer secular approval, that position 
seems to run counter to their central claim that individual "rights 
of conscience are doing all the relevant [legal] work."286 Democracy 
is valued not simply because it is politically desirable but because 
that political desirability necessarily stems from the robust protec-
tion of individual liberties that democracies champion, rights of 
conscience and association chief among them. If members of a dem-
ocratic society wish to arrange their religious institutions in a pa-
tently undemocratic manner, what right does a democratic govern-
ment have to interfere with this conscious choice? This argument 
would also prove too much: if churches cannot arrange their affairs 
in an undemocratic manner, and if, as Professors Schragger and 
Schwartzman contend, churches are indistinguishable from secular 
groups, could any groups within a democracy be undemocratically 
structured? It would seem that universities, privately held corpora-
tions, and, taken to its logical extreme, the nuclear family, would 
potentially be disallowed under their expansive distrust of undem-
ocratic institutions. 
But the fear of vast, undemocratically accountable exercises of 
church sovereignty is further quelled in light of responses to their 
jurisdictional critique. Professors Schragger and Schwartzman are 
principally worried about the scope of a church's sphere sover-
eignty. They ask, "What is the appropriate sphere of church sover-
eignty if the mission of the church is to save mankind? ... The 
strong form of sphere sovereignty claims that churches have a spe-
cial, unique, and exclusive mission to preach the Word, to convert 
the unconverted, and to glorify God."287 Kuyper would likely agree 
with this classification.288 So are there limiting principles? 
We wish here to reemphasize our original claim: that church 
autonomy is justified under a soft sovereignty approach. While 
286. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 969. 
287. Id. at 946. 
288. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 135. 
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Kuyper would have rejected the "hard sovereignty" approach,289 
his "strong form of sphere sovereignty" risks a potentially over-
broad application, as Professors Schragger and Schwartzman sug-
gest.290 But limiting the scope of the church's "sphere" -at least as 
an abstract matter-is possible, and we recognize that it's a practi-
cal necessity if church autonomy is to be legally recognized.291 
Even under Kuyper' s theory, the church is not all-encompass-
ing; the state, not the church, is the sphere of spheres. Thus, while 
escaping state membership is impossible, the state actually plays an 
important role in ensuring that, within its jurisdiction, those who 
wish to join a church may do so, and those who wish to leave a 
church may also do so.292 This understanding comports with 
Kuyper's posited "sovereignty of the individual person."293 Indeed, 
the state's "right and duty ... [t]o defend individuals and the weak 
ones, in those spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest"294 
would be hollow if it could not cabin the church's exercise of its 
sphere sovereignty to governing its members. 
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman respond that "because 
the institution of the church is the church for all, and because saving 
souls is central to its mission, the church's jurisdiction can and must 
be extended to all .... [Indeed], Christianity and Islam are explicit 
about their claims to universality."295 But this critique misses the 
point. Just because some churches believe they have sovereign ju-
risdiction over all of mankind does not confer to them such juris-
diction given the state's dictates under the sphere sovereignty ap-
proach. A Christian may try to convert nonbelievers to the faith, but 
until the nonbeliever himself chooses Christianity, no Christian 
church may claim sovereign authority over him.296 Kuyper thought 
289. See id. 
290. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 946. 
291. See infra Part V.C. 
292. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. 
293. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 139. 
294. Id. at 124. 
295. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 947. 
296. See id. at 957-62. 
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that all nations should be Christian.297 But even he understood that 
worldwide Christian rule could "never be realized except through 
the subjective convictions of those in authority, according to their 
personal views of the demands of that Christian principle."298 If 
leaders of nation states were not rightfully subjected to the jurisdic-
tion of the church until they themselves converted, it must be true 
that laymen are afforded this same personal autonomy of choice, 
with the state serving as the enforcer of the various spheres' bound-
aries. Therefore, it is possible to limit a church's grandiose exercise 
of its sovereignty to its own sphere. 
Nothing in the preceding paragraphs should be taken to sug-
gest that churches must forfeit their right to persuade others to join 
their faith in the public square. Just as secular social spheres may 
try to increase their membership, so too may churches. The preced-
ing discussion stands for the principle that unless and until a per-
son decides to join a church, that church has no sovereign authority 
over that person because that person is rightfully outside of the 
church's sphere and thus its sovereign control. A church's concep-
tion of what constitutes its sphere-for example, the Christian be-
lief that all human persons are children of God 299 - and the exercise 
of sovereignty within that sphere may not always line up. Such dif-
ferences are reconcilable given a state that, "[w]henever different 
spheres clash[,] ... compel[s] mutual regard for the boundary-lines 
of each."300 
Thus, we agree with Professors Schragger and Schwartzman 
that voluntary church membership is a necessary condition for 
churches to exercise authority under our soft sovereignty ap-
proach. 301 That certain religions might not view membership as vol-
untary has no bearing on how the state must treat those churches. 
297. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 135. 
298. Id. 
299. Cf Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 946 ("[C]hurches often assert 
that their jurisdiction extends to non-members of the institution. Indeed, it may be a 
central doctrine of the church that it alone appropriately rules in all spiritual and tem-
poral matters regardless of membership."). 
300. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 124. 
301. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 957. 
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If a member in such a church cannot leave even though she wishes 
to, the state has the rightful power-and in fact, duty-to ensure 
the free flow of members between social spheres.302 We further 
agree that this voluntarism disallows the state from "assisting in 
coercing non-members while requiring the state to enforce exit 
rights,"303 but we disagree that voluntary church membership ne-
cessitates church autonomy based on conscience or associational 
rights, as opposed to religious freedom. The soft sovereignty frame-
work allows for sovereignty-based autonomy wherein sphere 
members may join and leave sovereign spheres as they please. We 
acknowledge that separating from a church is not always easy 
given the "coercive" doctrines of certain churches and other inter-
nal pressures to stay.304 The potential costs of leaving do not under-
mine that the choice of leaving is voluntary ( or is at least viewed as 
such by the government) in the first place. As long as it is possible 
to leave-so ensured by the state's obligation and duty to protect 
against abuses of sovereign power-the necessary condition of vol-
untary church membership is satisfied.305 Soft° sovereignty is com-
patible with and is in fact premised upon voluntarism (which is 
also consistent with Kuyper' s treatment of individuals as another 
separate sphere).306 
3. Sphere Sovereignty, Churches, and Tax Ben-
efits 
The tax exemption and charitable contribution deduction enjoyed 
by churches are justified in light of the above sphere sovereignty 
framework. The United States, along with state and local govern-
ments, constitutes the sphere of spheres as the state, while churches 
are one of a plethora of social spheres within Am~rican society.307 
Both the United States and churches are spheres, so each must 
302. See supra notes 239-243 and accompanying text. 
303. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 960. 
304. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 141-42. 
305. See Schrager & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 960. 
306. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 127 ("[T]he struggle for liberty is not only declared 
permissible, but is made a duty for each individual in his own sphere."). 
307. But see infra Part IV.C. (distinguishing churches). 
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abide by the principle of noninterference essential to Kuyper' s ap-
proach.308 Recall that the state has three affirmative duties, the first 
two of which require the state to keep peace among spheres and to 
defend individuals within spheres "against the abuse of power," 
respectively.309 It is from the third, "to coerce all together to bear 
personal and financial burdens for the maintenance of the natural 
unity of the State," that the state derives its legitimate power to levy 
taxes.310 But this power is checked by the first two duties in con-
formity with the principle of noninterference.311 All spheres have 
the natural right to exercise the inherent sovereignty "original to 
them."312 The argument we advance herein, based on the soft sov-
ereignty theory articulated above, provides a philosophical basis 
upon which the special tax treatment of churches can be explained 
in light of Bob Jones University. We later offer a number of practical, 
necessary line-drawing limitations to curb overzealous application 
of the soft sovereignty approach in this context.313 
First, the tax exemption. As sphere of spheres, the United States 
has an obligation to respect the inherent sovereignty of churches. 
The state does this most obviously by affording churches the au-
tonomy to manage their own property.314 Any taxation levied upon 
any entity necessarily entangles that entity with the state. When the 
state does not tax an entity, it reduces entanglement, increasing the 
autonomy afforded to that entity. Because churches are to be auton-
omous within their own spheres, the state ought not tax churches 
because in so doing, it allows churches the fullest control over their 
resources. Churches, as soft sovereigns, ought to be afforded the 
autonomy to enjoy complete control over the allocation of their 
property-money and otherwise-without the outside influence of 
the state interfering with that control. Taxes necessarily infringe 
upon this right. Therefore, if the state and churches truly are soft 
308. See supra notes 240-242 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
310. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 124-25 (emphasis omitted). 
311. Id. at 125. 
312. Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 110. 
313. See infra Part V.C. 
314. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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sovereigns within the sphere sovereignty framework, taxing 
churches violates the autonomy inherent to them. Refraining from 
taxing churches is also consistent with the state's duty to adhere to 
the principle of noninterference. So while tax exemption is not nec-
essarily constitutionally required for the reasons previously dis-
cussed, it is desirable as a policy matter. In addition, once tax ex-
emption is granted, this soft sovereignty approach argues against 
taking away that benefit for violating fundamental public policy. 
Second, the charitable contribution deduction is also justified in 
light of the sphere sovereignty approach. The United States re-
spects the sovereignty of churches by allowing them to manage 
their own property.315 It follows that the United States must afford 
church members this same autonomy, at least with respect to the 
church members' property that is charitably given to a church. To 
comply with the principle of noninterference in its treatment of 
churches, while at the same time not extending similar treatment to 
church members, is a contradiction in terms: What is a church- and 
more broadly, a sphere-if not a collection of members? Respecting 
the autonomy of churches to manage their property thus necessi-
tates the charitable contribution deduction. A church member may 
rightly contend that his annual gift to his church is not first "his" 
money that upon his donation becomes "the church's." Rather, the 
donated money always belonged to the church. The member is 
merely the medium by which that money is transferred from one 
sphere, call it "the market,"316 to another, namely, "the church." 
Once there, as was shown above, that money is rightfully free from 
taxation. But for the charitable contribution deduction, property 
that belongs to churches would, in effect, be taxed via the increased 
tax base to which church members would be susceptible, increasing 
their taxes owed to the state.317 Consequently, churches would not 
315. Id. 
316. Of course, money that remains in the sphere we have labeled "the market," 
which ought to be defined extremely broadly, is susceptible to taxation under the third 
duty of state spheres. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
317. This "tax base" argument differs from those disfavored in the text accompany-
ing supra note 203. Above, the "tax base" in question is the church's income itself. But 
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be afforded the sovereignty inherent to them but would instead be 
subjugated to the coercive power of the state in contradiction of the 
principle of noninterference. Of course, not all faiths teach that fi-
nancial contributions to the church are obligatory, nor do all adher-
ents of faiths that have such teachings necessarily agree with or fol-
low them,318 but it is reasonable to apply this policy to churches of 
all faiths in order to avoid the difficult task of distinguishing among 
them on this ground. And again, this is a policy, not constitutional, 
argument that both supports providing the charitable contribution 
for donations to churches and not taking away that benefit for vio-
lating fundamental public policy. 
Moreover, the charitable contribution deduction is the govern-
ment's way of fostering comity toward the church. Church mem-
bers pay taxes, and the state leaves to the church its share through 
the charitable contribution deduction. The availability of the stand-
ard deduction as a way of effectuating the charitable contribution 
deduction does not undermine the philosophical basis upon which 
the deduction is offered because the standard deduction exists not 
to undermine the principles underlying itemized deductions but is 
instead a practical choice by Congress to simplify tax collection. 319 
By allowing church members to reduce their taxable income based 
on money they donate to churches, through either an itemized or 
standard deduction, the government not only acknowledges the 
autonomy of churches to manage their own money, but it also rec-
ognizes that the sphere that is "the church" is composed of individ-
uals whose allegiance to the church cannot be cause for their ad-
verse treatment under the principle of noninterference. Without the 
charitable contribution deduction, church members who give to 
their churches would per se owe a higher percentage of their post-
contribution income in taxes and would thus have less disposable 
with the charitable contribution deduction addressed here, the "tax base" refers to a 
private citizen's taxable income. 
318. See David W. Case, Comment, Resolving the Conflict Between Chapter 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Free Exercise Clause- In re Green: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 
57 MISS. L.J. 163, 164-65 (1987). 
319. Steve R. Johnson, Administrability-Based Tax Simplification, 4 NEV. L.J. 573, 584-
86 (2004). 
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income than would those who do not donate to churches. Having 
the "right and duty" to "compel mutual regard for the boundary-
lines of [different spheres]" and to "defend individuals ... against 
the abuse of power," the state cannot rightfully allow such adverse 
treatment between those who donate to churches and those who do 
not.320 
Furthermore, from an empirical standpoint, seventy-four percent 
of churches' revenue comes from charitable contributions.321 Econ-
omists predict that without the charitable contribution deduction, 
charitable gifts to churches would decrease by just over twenty-two 
percent,322 which would have a major impact given that in 2017 
American churches received over $127.37 billion in contributions.323 
This figure likely is lower now because of recent tax law changes 
that will cause a substantial decrease in the proportion of house-
holds that itemize their deductions.324 Nevertheless, the loss of eli-
gibility to receive tax deductible contributions almost certainly 
would still have a significant negative effect on giving to churches 
since many high-income households can still take advantage of this 
deduction.325 Therefore, the United States as the sphere of spheres 
has the power, via its taxation policies, to substantially affect 
churches' budgets. To abide by the principle of noninterference, 
and against the reality that donations to churches have been tax de-
ductible for generations, the government should refrain from en-
acting policies that reduce the amount of funds available to 
churches. Eradicating the charitable contribution deduction would 
have this effect, a clear reduction of the degree of autonomy a 
320. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 124-25. 
321. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A 
Two-Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS & GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION & CONFLICT 133, 
137 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2011). 
322. Id. at 138. 
323. Thad S. Austin et al., Giving to Religion, in GIVING USA 2018: THE ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2017, at 173 (2017). 
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church exercises over its resources. Consequently, if a church 
taught that its members ought not pay taxes to the government, the 
church itself would cease to abide by the principle of noninterfer-
ence. Fair treatment among spheres-and especially fairness be-
tween the state and churches-runs in both directions. 
B. First Amendment Institutions 
While the concept of sphere sovereignty provides a philosophical 
basis for the proposed soft sovereignty approach in applying Bob 
Jones University to churches, the First Amendment provides a legal 
basis. About twenty years ago, dissatisfaction with the rules and 
categories of First Amendment law gave rise to what has been 
called the "institutional tum."326 In the "pre-legal world," individ-
uals are not the only actors. Activities, specifically those which 
would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment, "hap-
pen[] ... through and by institutions."327 This real-world observa-
tion inspired a fresh approach to First Amendment issues, one that 
contends that institutions are morally relevant actors for the "defi-
nitions and distinctions drawn in First Amendment doctrine."328 
That is, under this First Amendment institution theory, the substan-
tive guarantees of the First Amendment protect not only individu-
als but groups of organized individuals-namely, institutions.329 
To determine what constitutes a First Amendment institution, 
Professor Horwitz proposes that two elements be satisfied: that the 
institution plays a central role in public discourse, and possesses 
self-regulatory norms and practices.330 The former is not so broad 
as to encompass any institution that contributes to public discourse 
but is limited to those institutions that are "fundamental" to the 
"infrastructure" of public discourse.331 Thus, while other types of 
326. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 74-75; Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? To-
wards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 276-84 
(2008). 
327. Garnett, supra note 326, at 277. 
328. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 74-75 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 81. 
331. Id. at 244. 
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legal entities participate in public discourse, they are not essential 
to its infrastructure in the way that newspapers, libraries, and uni-
versities are.332 Additionally, institutions that are self-regulating-
those that "operate according to a rich set of norms, practices, and 
rules" -satisfy the second prong of the First Amendment institu-
tion definition and ought to be legally recognized as such.333 This 
two-prong definition serves as a helpful guide for characterizing 
institutional actors for First Amendment purposes. 
The above discussion on soft sovereignty supplies the theoretical 
basis for affording First Amendment institutions some sovereign 
control.334 In short, the government ought to respect the autonomy 
inherent to First Amendment institutions, as they are sovereign 
within their own spheres. This soft sovereignty approach is not, as 
was shown above, without its limits, and the government may still 
restrict the conduct of such institutions, at least in some respects.335 
The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment remain, however, 
necessary protections against an.over-intrusive state. 
Building upon this institutional framework, many commentators 
have argued that churches should be recognized as First Amend-
ment institutions.336 Applying Professor Horwitz's two-part test 
renders churches First Amendment institutions, for they "are 
surely well-established, self-governing institutions with a 
longstanding infrastructural role in public discourse and a unique 
332. See id. 
333. Id. at 86. 
334. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 93-96. 
335. See infra Part V.C. 
336. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 174-93; Garnett, supra note 326; Richard W. 
Garnett, The Freedom of the Church: (Toward) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, in 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 39, 45 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 
2016); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 
(1981); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy Doctrine: 
Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 460-61 (2011); cf Steven D. 
Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church? (Univ. of San Diego Legal Stud. Rsch. 
Paper Series, Paper No. 11-061, 2011) (arguing that the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses are about collective religious practice), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412 [https://perma.cc/ZF6V-P4EN]. 
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set of contributions to make to it."337 Moreover, the constitutional 
text supports an institutional conception of churches under the First 
Amendment. As Professor Richard Garnett argues, "An apprecia-
tion for the rights and independence of religious institutions, and 
an account of the implications of these rights for the financial, reg-
ulatory, cooperative and other relations between religious and gov-
ernmental institutions, is a crucial component of any attractive ac-
count of the Religion Clauses."338 
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly applied the institu-
tional approach to churches in First Amendment challenges relat-
ing to taxes, it has assumed that religious institutions (and churches 
specifically) enjoy First Amendment protections.339 In Bob Jones Uni-
versity itself, the Court assumed that Bob Jones University and 
Goldsboro Christian Schools-both religious schools-were pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause.340 It ultimately concluded that 
the government's compelling interest in eradicating racial discrim-
ination in education outweighed the religious schools' free exercise 
rights.341 But it nonetheless assumed that the First Amendment ap-
plied to the religious schools as such.342 And in church property dis-
pute cases, the Court has unambiguously recognized the First 
Amendment rights of churches.343 The leap from these precedents 
to affording First Amendment protections to churches in the tax 
context-a subset of religious organizations-is a small one at best. 
The next Part explores why this is the case. 
337. HORWITZ, supra note 258, at 176; see also id. at 244 ("Certain entities-churches, 
newspapers, libraries, and so on-are clearly vital parts of that infrastructure [of public 
discourse]."). 
338. Garnett, supra note 326, at 293. 
339. See infra note 343. 
340. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983). 
341. Id. at 604. 
342. See also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berm, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 
(2020) (applying the Religion Clauses to a religious school); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188--92 (2012) (same). 
343. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448--52 (1969); Kedroff v. 
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952). 
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C. Churches Distinguished 
Theoretically, the soft sovereignty theory and First Amendment 
institution framework could justify the special tax treatment of 
many non-religious groups. In Bob Jones University, the Supreme 
Court applied the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine 
to non-church religious institutions over their First Amendment ob-
jections. Because we accept Bob Jones University as a given for pur-
poses of this Article, it is necessary to determine whether churches 
can and should be distinguished from non-churches when it comes 
to applying this doctrine. This Part argues that defining what con-
stitutes a "church" is philosophically possible and is legally both 
possible and necessary. 
1. Philosophical Basis for Distinguishing 
Churches 
Religious skeptics-Professors Schragger and Schwartzman 
among them-argue that the soft sovereignty approach to church-
state relations proves too much, that the sphere sovereignty justifi-
cation covers not only churches but could logically be extended to 
encompass all social spheres, including religious schools or hospi-
tals. 344 Moreover, why should the neighborhood fraternal organiza-
tion or local small business not enjoy the same tax benefits that 
churches do given the sphere sovereignty framework? And further, 
if religious institutions can be distinguished from secular groups, is 
it possible to further delineate between churches and other kinds of 
religious organizations such as religious schools and hospitals? 
Their main contention lies with the first question; once churches 
can be distinguished from secular groups in theory, the law be-
comes the forum for the finer line-drawing required to answer the 
second question.345 
Professors Schragger and Schwartzman' s objection does not take 
up, as others have, the debate over whether religion is an inherent 
344. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 946. 
345. See id. at 956 n.166. 
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good, nor do they attempt to empirically weigh the (secularly per-
ceived) social good against the (secularly perceived) social harm 
that churches promulgate.346 Instead, they phrase and reject the 
sphere-theorist's claim as follows: "The religious institutional-
ist ... has to claim not only that religion is good but that organized 
religion facilitates, promotes, or is constitutive of that good."347 
Stated another way, the sphere-theorist's "instrumental 
claim ... asserts that churches provide non-theologically-based 
benefits to society. But this raises the question of whether churches 
do so uniquely."348 While we have slight reservations about the 
characterization of what exactly sphere-theorists must prove, we 
nonetheless engage in the debate as so framed. 
In support of their argument, Professors Schragger and Schwartz-
man slightly mischaracterize Kuyper's theory. They note that 
Kuyper taught that sovereign spheres included "the family, the 
business, science, art and so forth."349 But that litany does not pre-
clude a distinct conception of the church-as-sphere; indeed, it is en-
tirely silent on "the Church."35° Kuyper scholar Professor Nicholas 
Wolterstorff assures us that it is "unmistakably clear that [Kuyper] 
regarded the church as fundamentally unique and regarded its au-
tonomy under God as more fundamental than that of any other in-
stitution."351 A cursory glance at the presentment of his sphere the-
ory shows that Kuyper was careful to maintain distinctions 
between the State, Society, and the Church.352 
Kuyper' s main, albeit implicit, distinguishing factor is that 
churches are necessarily rooted in religious truths, whereas non-
religious groups are not.353 Churches, then, are social spheres that 
adhere to and practice religion, and non-churches are social spheres 
346. See id. at 950. 
347. Id. at 949 (emphasis omitted). 
348. Id. at 953. 
349. Id. at 948 n.122 (citing KUYPER, supra note 221, at 90). 
350. See id. at 948-49. 
351. Wolterstorff, supra note 219, at 116. 
352. See KUYPER, supra note 221, at 99, 127. 
353. See id. at 128-30. 
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that do not adhere to nor practice religion.354 Professors Schragger 
and Schwartzman do not look at the specific beliefs held by 
churches or any social institution as a basis for distinguishing 
among them, and they accordingly make two errors in not crediting 
"religion" as a distinctive quality of churches. First, they assume 
that churches justify their institutional autonomy on conscience or 
associational rights-as opposed to collective doctrinal adher-
ence-in setting the parameters of the church's sphere. Second, 
they rely upon that assumption to group churches together with 
other social institutions. But religious sphere theorists reject their 
first assumption in favor of a church uniqueness based on "religi-
osity." If religion is unique to churches, and by all accounts it is, 
then Professors Schragger and Schwartzman' s conclusion that 
churches are indistinguishable from secular spheres fails. 
Distinguishing churches from other social spheres on the basis of 
religion is, however, only half the battle for the religious sphere the-
orist. The question still remains: Why does religion deserve special 
treatment? That is, even if churches are distinguishable from secu-
lar spheres, what about the nature of religion requires that churches 
receive favors from the state?355 The secularly perceived benefits of 
a religious society are plentiful356 but contested.357 In any matter, the 
intangible benefits are ultimately what tip the scale in favor of a 
governmental structure that recognizes the importance of preserv-
ing a religious populace. 
While some would disagree, we would argue that religion as a 
whole, albeit in its best form and in ways that vary among faiths, is 
a conduit for social and moral good. So promulgated by churches, 
354. See id. 
355. This is the argument Professors Schragger and Schwartzman ultimately raise. 
See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text. 
356. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 950 n.131. 
357. See id. at 950 n.130. 
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religions teach their adherents principles, in both form and sub-
stance, that are unique among other social spheres.358 Religion pro-
motes respect for authority, a necessary feature of a sustainable de-
mocracy.359 It fosters concern for one's community and for the poor, 
and as one commentator put it, "Exclusive concern for self-interest 
is the very definition of the corruption of republican virtue."360 Re-
ligion occupies a unique space because "[c]hurches, as communi-
ties of spiritual discernment and moral reflection, can begin conver-
sations about the common good within their own communities and 
then reach out to include other persons and institutions."361 Reli-
gious groups make the pursuit of supernatural and moral truths 
their primary activity in a way that secular organizations simply do 
not. And in a society in which rights are perceived as God-given,362 
religion plays a vital role in promoting the dignity of the human 
person - a dignity that the law endeavors to recognize and pro-
tect. 363 
2. Legal Basis for Distinguishing Churches 
But regardless of whether one accepts this philosophical argu-
ment, is there a legal basis for distinguishing churches from other 
types of religious organizations? The Court itself suggested there 
may be in carefully setting to the side whether its holding in Bob 
358. See e.g., PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SO-
CIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH (2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifi-
cal_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-
soc_en.html [https://perma.cc/KQ7W-EDYF]. 
359. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA 82-84 (1984). 
360. Robert N. Bellah, Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic, Soe'Y, 
May/June 1978, at 16, 20. 
361. BRIAN STILTNER, RELIGION AND THE COMMON GOOD: CATHOLIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO BUILDING COMMUNITY IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 124 (1999). 
362. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness." (emphasis added)). 
363. See id. ("That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... "). 
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Jones University applied to "churches or other purely religious insti-
tutions."364 And while the Court in some decisions has extended re-
ligious liberty protections to non-church religious organizations-
for example, the ministerial exception cases both involved religious 
schools365-in others it appears to have limited those protections to 
churches.366 Finally, when a non-church religious organization pro-
vides secular services or goods such as education or health care in 
a manner that is contrary to fundamental public policy, the govern-
ment's interest in not supporting that organization through tax ben-
efits is significantly stronger than in the church context. This is be-
cause, as the IRS has noted, provision of such services in a manner 
strongly disfavored by the government can, for example in the case 
of racial discrimination, "reasonably be expected to aggravate the 
disparity in the educational, economic, or social levels of [ a racial] 
group when compared with society as a whole,"367 while a typical 
church discriminating with respect to employment, religious ser-
vices, or membership will likely not have such an effect. 
Therefore, even if a religious or sphere sovereignty skeptic ad-
heres to the conscience-based conception of church autonomy, re-
jects the idea of the church as a First Amendment institution, or 
finds the above-proffered arguments for the distinctive treatment 
of churches altogether unconvincing, the law has recognized that 
churches can be distinguished and that churches, as religious or-
ganizations, ought to receive special treatment under the First 
Amendment. This observation does not dismiss the justifications 
364. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983). 
365. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berm, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020); 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 174 (2012). 
366. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (affirming the First Amendment 
limitations on the role of civil courts to resolve church property disputes); Kedroff v. 
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (identifying churches as having a partic-
ular freedom from state interference as a matter of religious liberty); Watson v. Jones, 
80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1871) (recognizing that decisions of church bodies are not review-
able by civil courts when based on internal church law); see also Ira Mark Ellman, Driven 
from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 
1403 (1981); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 57-58 (2002). 
367. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mero. 89-10-001 (Mar. 10, 1989); see supra note 86. 
222 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 44 
offered above, it merely acknowledges that the law recognizes the 
uniqueness of churches, even if the underlying rationale for doing 
so has not been systematically and consistently explained. In other 
words, the American system has accepted the distinct space that 
churches occupy given the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 
which themselves single out religion from other social spheres. 368 
As a practical matter then, we consider some instances in which 
courts have distinguished churches from non-churches so as to in-
form the line-drawing necessary to advance our position that Bob 
Jones University should apply in a more limited fashion to churches. 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court was careful to reserve the 
question of how the reasoning of Bob Jones University would apply 
to "churches or other purely religious institutions."369 While its ba-
sis for doing so could reasonably be viewed as the fact that the pub-
lic policy at issue related to education and so only applied to 
schools, there is another basis for distinguishing churches (and per-
haps "other purely religious institutions," whatever exactly that 
means) from religious schools, hospitals, and other types of entities. 
That basis is the same one that underlies the ministerial exception 
with respect to the employment of religious leaders (albeit an ex-
ception the Court has extended beyond churches),370 the limited 
role of civil courts in resolving church property disputes, 371 and the 
autonomy or soft sovereignty justification for the tax benefits gen-
erally enjoyed by churches372-that the internal affairs of churches 
should generally not be subject to government interference because 
of both free exercise and entanglement concerns under the First 
Amendment. 
In addition to the theoretical factors by which to distinguish 
churches for tax benefit purposes, the Constitution itself offers 
some distinguishing characteristics unique to the church setting. 
368. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) 
Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515 (2007); Lupu & Tuttle, supra 
note 366. 
369. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 594, 604 n.29 (1983). 
370. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 272, at 975. 
371. See supra note 366. 
372. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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For example, while the Supreme Court accepted the constitution-
ally based ministerial exception in the context of a religious school, 
its reasoning applies even more strongly to churches. The Court de-
signed the exception to prevent "government interference with an 
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the 
church itself ."373 The Court thus distinguished laws that inci-
dentally burden outward expressions of religious conduct, such as 
the ban on the ingestion of peyote that the Court upheld even as 
applied to sacramental use in Employment Division v. Smith.374 While 
the ministerial exception cases are of course limited to the employ-
ment context, the reasoning in those cases mirrors that in cases in-
volving internal church decisions that affect the faith and mission 
of the church itself, such as the church property disputes for which 
the Court has prohibited civil court involvement if they involve 
church law or ecclesiastical disputes.375 Such decisions would in-
clude, for example, those who may participate in religious activities 
and in what role.376 The soft sovereignty justification applies simi-
larly to the tax context. If taxation would significantly interfere with 
the internal affairs of a church, then this respect for soft sovereignty 
should prevent such taxation. The key questions in both contexts 
are what falls within a church's internal affairs and what limits may 
be drawn. 
The legal basis for the soft sovereignty justification is therefore 
the First Amendment. In requiring churches to conform their inter-
nal affairs to fundamental public policy when doing so is contrary 
to their religious beliefs, taxing churches for failure to comply with 
such policy substantially burdens free exercise of religion and in-
vites substantial entanglement, and so is not permissible constitu-
tionally absent a compelling governmental reason to do so. If a 
church engages in illegal activity, especially criminal activity, then 
373. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 
(2012). 
374. Id. 
375. See supra note 366. 
376. See Mikochik, supra note 95, at 205 (freedom of expressive association protected 
by the First Amendment protects those "who could join in liturgy" even if, under Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, it does not encompass "what that liturgy could include"). 
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that would generally provide such a reason, but non-illegal activity 
that conflicts with fundamental public policy generally does not. 
D. Defining "Church" 
This Article thus far argues that employing a soft sovereignty in-
terpretation of Bob Jones University applied to churches is appropri-
ate on philosophical and legal grounds and leads to a more limited 
application of that decision to churches than to charities. But what 
exactly is a "church"? Both Kuyper and the Supreme Court hesitate 
to allow the government to decide what constitutes a church. 
Kuyper posits that it is the church's "privilege, and not that of the 
State, to determine her own characteristics as the true Church, and 
to proclaim her own confession, as the confession of the truth."377 
And the Court has echoed this view, steering clear of deciding cases 
on the basis of "the faith and mission of the church itself."378 But the 
church, as one social sphere among many, albeit a privileged one 
given the First Amendment, is not free to avoid all interactions with 
the government, and the Court ought not balk at deciding difficult 
First Amendment questions. For purposes of applying the funda-
mental public policy doctrine as we frame it, defining what exactly 
constitutes a church becomes a necessary line-drawing problem 
with which the courts must engage. 
Which organizations should qualify as churches in the tax benefit 
context must be meaningfully limited. The existing IRS multi-factor 
test is difficult to apply and may lead to organizations that do not 
appear to be a church under most definitions being recognized as 
such for federal tax purposes.379 Indeed, commentators are increas-
ingly concerned that the definition is already being stretched be-
yond recognition.380 Some courts are moving toward a test that con-
siders many relevant factors but gives greatest weight to a 
377. KUYPER, supra note 221, at 137. 
378. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
379. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
380. See, e.g., Lidiya Mishchenko, In Defense of Churches: Can the IRS Limit Tax Abuse 
by "Church" Impostors?, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1361, 1367-81 (2016); Christine Roem-
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congregational approach.381 Such an approach requires the regular, 
in-person gathering of individuals to engage in worship and other 
communal religious activities and appears to be better fit for what 
constitutionally should be viewed as a church and therefore eligible 
for this approach. 382 
The congregational approach has acquired acceptance among 
courts383 and commentators,384 perhaps because it is an easily ad-
ministrable, objective test and is arguably consistent with the text 
and history of the Religion Clauses. Narrow definitions, like the 
congregational approach, ensure that our proposed application of 
Bob Jones University to churches does not encompass a larger cate-
gory of tax-exempt organizations than is necessary, desirable, or 
constitutionally required. But whatever definition is ultimately 
adopted, if a categorical definition is adopted at all, it must account 
for the basic distinction that the congregational approach captures 
well: churches are a subset of religious organizations, which are 
themselves a subset of Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations. 
To the extent that a narrow, court-made definition of church 
would exclude some entities that would otherwise qualify as a 
hildt Moore, Comment, Religious Tax Exemption and the "Charitable Scrutiny" Test, 15 RE-
GENT U. L. REV. 295, 307 (2003); Sarah Pullman Bailey, Major evangelical nonprofits are 
trying a new strategy with the IRS that allows them to hide their salaries, WASH. POST, Jan. 
17, 2020. 
381. See cases cited infra note 383. 
382. Transitory crises that make in-person services impossible-like pandemics-
would not undermine an institution's legal status as a church, so long as it intends to 
resume in-person gatherings as soon as the transitory crisis ends. See Zachary B. Pohl-
man, "Churches" in a Time of Coronavirus, CANOPY FORUM (Oct. 2, 2020), https://cano-
pyforum.org/2020/10/02/churches-in-a-time-of-coronavirus/ [https:/ /perma.cc/S6J2-
KKTC]. 
383. See, e.g., Found. of Hum. Understanding v. United States, 614 F.3d 1383, 1391 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Church of Eternal Life & Liberty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 916, 924 
(1986); Church of Visible Intelligence That Governs the Universe v. United States, 4 Cl. 
Ct. 55, 65 (1983). 
384. See, e.g., Mirkay, supra note 106, at 740; Jacob E. Dean, "Do You Have That New 
Church App for Your iPhone?": Making the Case for A Clearer and Broader Definition of 
Church Under the Internal Revenue Code, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 173, 202 (2013); Wendy 
Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 345, 351-52 
(1990). 
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church under the IRS multi-factor test, there is no legal incon-
sistency. Churches, under the Bob Jones University framework, are a 
constitutional class, not a statutory or regulatory carve out. The IRS 
is, of course, free to exceed the constitutional floor in affording tax 
benefits to more groups than the Constitution requires. The IRS 
could not, however, exclude groups that would otherwise qualify 
as a church under a constitutional definition. 
V. REVISITING CHURCHES AND BOB JONES UNIVERSITY 
There are at least three ways to approach the application of Bob 
Jones University to churches today. One way would be to take the 
contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine as stated in that 
case and assume it applies with equal force to religious organiza-
tions of all types, including churches. This is the approach that the 
IRS takes385 and was the approach we took in Part IL This approach 
led us to identify at least two areas of current conflict-sex discrim-
ination, particularly in employment, and sanctuary churches-
where the tax benefits enjoyed by a significant number of churches 
could be at risk. We also identified at least two areas of likely future 
conflict, although opposition to the church practice does not yet rise 
to the level of a fundamental public policy, in the case of sexual 
orientation discrimination, and the practice appears rare, in the case 
of polygamy. 
Another approach would be to limit Bob Jones University to its his-
torical and factual context-both the decades-long battle against ra-
cial segregation in education and the broader civil rights move-
ment. The question would then become whether any of the current 
or likely future conflicts involve a similar confluence of strong po-
litical and societal pressures. This approach essentially asks 
whether the public policy at issue in Bob Jones University is distin-
guishable from the ones identified in Part II even if some or all of 
the latter might be considered fundamental. For the reasons de-
tailed previously, we reject this approach.386 
385. See supra note 39. 
386. See supra Part II.A. 
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A third approach would be to consider not whether the funda-
mental public policies identified are distinguishable from the pol-
icy at issue in Bob Jones University, but instead whether the institu-
tions being discussed here-churches-are distinguishable from 
the institutions involved in that case. For the reasons discussed 
above, our conclusion is that this is the best approach for deciding 
how, if at all, Bob Jones University should apply to churches, subject 
to certain limitations detailed in this Part. 
A. Current Significant Conflicts 
1. Sex Discrimination 
With respect to sex discrimination, whether in employment, 
membership, provision of goods or services related to religious ac-
tivity, or teachings, any attempt by the government to remove tax 
benefits from a church for such behavior would significantly inter-
fere with internal church decisions and affairs (assuming the dis-
crimination is based on religious doctrine) because it would almost 
certainly closely relate to the faith and mission of the church. The 
contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doctrine should therefore 
not extend to this situation due to the religious liberty protections 
provided by the First Amendment, subject to the limits discussed 
further below. 
2. Protecting and Serving Undocumented Im-
migrants 
Unlike sex discrimination, which occurs only within the "sphere" 
of the church, sanctuary churches present a more complicated situ-
ation. The sphere of authority inherent to churches collides with the 
government's sphere of authority, both theoretically and physi-
cally, when churches harbor undocumented immigrants who 
would otherwise be deported. Setting aside whether churches who 
provide sanctuary act illegally, 387 the question becomes whether the 
387. And at least one commentator has argued that such church action likely would 
not be illegal today. See Scott-Railton, supra note 116, at 417-19. 
228 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 44 
IRS can revoke the tax benefits of churches for opposing the funda-
mental public policy of not interfering with legal deportations 
when churches provide sanctuary. 
On the one hand, nothing is more private-and hence, more re-
moved from potential state interference-than how a church con-
ducts itself within its own four walls. If the sphere metaphor is to 
have any practical implications, it must at least mean that the state 
cannot physically intrude upon the sanctuary absent extraordinar-
ily compelling reasons for doing so (such as to prevent criminal ac-
tivity). On the other hand, part of the "good" that churches offer to 
society is fostering respect for authority and promoting democratic 
principles.388 Openly defying immigration law seems to· cut against 
this justification for the special treatment of churches within soci-
ety. 
Consider the church whose religious doctrine necessitates safe-
guarding the undocumented immigrant.389 That church is faced 
with a mutually exclusive choice: obey Caesar or obey God. That is, 
comply with secular law (and fundamental public policy) but vio-
late religious law by releasing the immigrant to law enforcement, 
thereby retaining secular tax benefits, or comply with religious law 
by harboring the immigrant, thereby forfeiting secular tax benefits. 
Were a church to face such an ultimatum, its freedom of religious 
expression would be seriously threatened. In fact, the sanctuary 
church situation presents a quintessential example of the respective 
388. See supra notes 359-363 and accompanying text. 
389. See Jonathan Zasloff, Sanctuary, Civil Disobedience, and Jewish Law l (UCLA Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper no. 19-33, 2019), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3460605 [https://perma.cc/WU3N-S7MX] Oewish law requires 
synagogues to shelter asylum-seekers from immigration authorities under certain cir-
cumstances); U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, AD Hoc COMMITIEE FOR RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY, OUR FIRST, MOST CHERISHED LIBERTY: A STATEMENT ON RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY 3 (2012) (challenging state laws prohibiting the "harboring" of undocumented 
immigrants as conflicting with certain religious obligations), 
https://www.usccb.org/committees/religious-liberty /our-first-most-cherished-liberty 
[https://perma.cc/6RVH-Z74D]; Daniel Burke, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Amer-
ica just became the country's first "sanctuary church body," CNN (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/08/us/lutheran-sanctuary-church/index.html 
[https:/ /perma.cc/6C77-88V 4]. 
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authority that church and state have over their own populations. In 
this case, the coercive power of the state must yield to the soft sov-
ereignty inherent to the church when its members practice their re-
ligion. 
This outcome is bolstered in light of the sanctuary concept being 
historically and theologically tied into the concept of the church it-
self as a place of not only spiritual but physical shelter for those 
seeking safety.390 One aspect of the modem sanctuary movement is 
that churches provide their protection only to those willing to re-
main physically within the confines of an existing church build-
ing.391 It is this physical limitation that ultimately tips the scale in 
favor of churches. For undocumented immigrants, it sharply limits 
their freedom and activities, and for churches, it demonstrates the 
integration of the sanctuary concept with the existing church's faith 
and mission. 
B. Likely Future Significant Conflicts 
Part II also identified two issues that, while not currently gov-
erned by fundamental public policy, are likely to produce conflicts 
in the future-namely, sexual orientation discrimination and po-
lygamy. The social, political, and legal trajectory of the first issue is 
such that opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation may very well become a fundamental public policy. As for 
the second issue, it is possible that a greater number of churches 
that support polygamy may seek tax-exempt status and so create a 
conflict with the IRS, which has already indicated it considers op-
position to polygamy to be a fundamental public policy. Should ei-
ther of these developments occur, and should the IRS invoke Bob 
Jones University to repeal the tax benefits of a church that acts con-
trary to said fundamental public policy, the framework we offer 
above provides a way for courts to uphold the important religious 
390. See Rhonda Shapiro-Rieser, The Sanctuary Movement: A Brief History, CTR. FOR 
RELIGIOUS AND SPIRITUAL LIFE (Mar. l, 2017), https://sophia.smith.edu/religious-spir-
itual-life/2017/03/01/sanctuary-movement-history/ [https://perma.cc/JF24-KED8). 
391. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as Trump-Era Immi-
grant Sanctuaries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2016. 
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interests at stake, while it also draws certain bright-line rules on just 
how far both churches and the state can encroach into the sphere of 
the other. 
1. Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Solicitor General Verrilli's admission392 merely confirmed what 
appeared to be true: religious organizations that discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation are potentially susceptible to a Bob 
Jones University challenge in light of Obergefell. And if the federal 
government comes to consistently oppose sexual-orientation-based 
discrimination such that it becomes fundamental public policy, 393 
how ought the IRS or reviewing courts determine whether to strip 
churches of their tax benefits for violating such policy? Churches 
could discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in essentially 
two ways. They could (1) refuse to perform same-sex weddings or 
provide other religious services to persons with a certain sexual ori-
entation; or (2) disallow those who have a certain sexual orientation 
or who engage in certain prohibited sexual conduct from assuming 
positions of church authority or to be members at all. While cer-
tainly related, the two instances of disparate treatment are distinct 
and must be analyzed separately given a contrary-to-fundamental-
public-policy challenge. 
First, some churches, pursuant to their religious doctrine, do not 
perform same-sex weddings. Applying the above framework, we 
392. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
393. The federal government is not yet uniform in opposing discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. For example, while the Supreme Court recently held that 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment, the executive branch opposed this result and members of Congress were 
split in their views. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance in No. 17-1618 and Reversal in 
No. 17-1623, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618 et al. (U.S. Aug. 23, 2019); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Employers, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 
No. 17-1618 et al. (U.S. Aug. 23, 2019) (eight Senators and forty Representatives); Brief 
Of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, Bostock v. Clay-
ton Cty., No. 17-1618 et al. (U.S. July 3, 2019) (thirty-nine Senators and 114 Representa-
tives). 
No.2] Fundamental Public Policy for Churches 231 
must consider whether performing weddings is an essentially in-
ternal practice of a church. That is, when a church performs a wed-
ding, is that an intrinsically religious activity, or are weddings out-
side the scope of a church's fundamentally religious beliefs and 
practices? The question answers itself. Whether a church holds re-
ligious views regarding marriage can be defined only by the church 
itself. Where a church holds to specific religious teachings regard-
ing marriage, the state cannot use its coercive power of taxation to 
encourage or pressure a church into violating its sincerely held re-
ligious beliefs. As the Supreme Court stated in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
"When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of 
the clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious 
grounds could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without 
denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion."394 While 
churches are not immune from all government interference under 
this approach,395 one obvious implication of the soft sovereignty 
justification is that a church must retain the autonomy to decide 
which religious ceremonies it conducts and how those ceremonies 
are conducted, weddings included. If a church is unwilling to per-
form same-sex marriages, no act of the state-be it through revoca-
tion of tax benefits or otherwise-can compel a church to do so. 
Such a coercive act would cause unnecessary entanglement by the 
state in the internal affairs of churches by directly influencing their 
liturgical practices and would potentially raise serious First 
Amendment problems regarding a church's right to free exercise of 
religion. 
The state's potential interference with liturgy in the marriage con-
text is different than banning the use of peyote in religious ceremo-
nies at issue in Employment Division v. Smith.396 Smith involved ille-
gal drug use.397 Refusing to perform same-sex marriages is not 
illegal but is rather contrary only to (potential) fundamental public 
policy. Moreover, in Smith, the religious observers were prohibited 
394. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). 
395. See infra Part V.C. 
396. 494 U.S. 872 (1989). 
397. Id. at 874. 
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from using peyote, but churches opposing same-sex marriage 
would be compelled to perform an act contrary to a sincerely held 
belief. When it comes to distinguishing inaction from action, requir-
ing the latter by law implicates a much greater liberty interest. Ad-
ditionally, Hosanna-Tabor confirms that "Smith involved govern-
ment regulation of only outward physical acts. [Discrimination in 
hiring ministers], in contrast, concerns government interference 
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission 
of the church itself."398 Surely weddings, which are liturgical acts 
that affect the faith and mission of a church, should be afforded this 
same protection. Thus, while the soft sovereignty approach neces-
sitates this result, current legal doctrine likewise supports this out-
come. 
Moreover, Obergefell itself, which at least implicitly predicted that 
same-sex marriage would become widely accepted,399 recognized 
that: 
[R]eligions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, 
may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction 
that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be 
condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious 
organizations and persons are given proper protection as 
they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and 
so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep 
aspirations to continue the family structure they have 
long revered.400 
Justice Kennedy envisioned that people on both sides of the same-
sex marriage discussion would continue to "engage those who dis-
agree with their view in an open and searching debate."401 He con-
cluded the section on religion by noting that, while churches have 
398. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 
(2012). 
399. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 676 (2015) (noting the numerous legislative 
debates, referenda, and scholarly arguments that same-sex marriage should be recog-
nized by the state). 
400. Id. at 679-80. 
401. Id. at 680. 
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the right to disagree with same-sex marriage, "[t]he Constitu-
tion ... does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from mar-
riage."402 Obergefell thus does not require churches to perform same-
sex marriages. If anything, it makes explicit the assumption that a 
church cannot legally be compelled to perform any marriages that 
are contrary to its sincerely held beliefs.403 Since Obergefell is argua-
bly the case-or more broadly, the moment-that will have ush-
ered in the acceptance of same-sex marriage as fundamental public 
policy, 404 looking to Obergefell for extra guidance on churches' obli-
gations under that policy makes sense. If the IRS does so, in accord-
ance with the framework offered above, it must afford churches the 
autonomy not to perform same-sex marriages without the potential 
of forfeiting otherwise available tax benefits. 
Second, some churches do not allow those who engage in same-
sex conduct or, less commonly, who have a same-sex orientation to 
obtain leadership positions within the church or possibly to be 
members or receive goods or services.405 Assuming again that fun-
damental public policy would someday be opposed to such dis-
crimination, ought churches that disallow those who engage in 
same-sex conduct or who have specified sexual orientations from 
obtaining leadership roles, being members, or receiving goods and 
services have to forfeit their tax benefits under a Bob Jones Univer-
sity-based challenge? Again, the answer must be "no." In light of 
the soft sovereignty approach to church autonomy, churches 
should have complete authority over their internal hiring, member-
ship, and goods and services provision practices-assuming al-
402. Id. (emphasis added) 
403. See id. 
404. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (applying Obergefell to strike a state 
rule that did not allow both same-sex spouses to be listed as parents on their child's 
birth certificate). 
405. See Julia Zauzmer & Sarah Pulliam Bailey, United Methodist Church votes to main-
tain its apposition to same-sex marriage, gay clergy, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/02/26/united-methodist-church-
votes-maintain-its-opposition-same-sex-marriage-gay-clergy / [https://perma.cc/Y97U-
JNY8]; supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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ways that any discrimination is founded upon sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs. The First Amendment must allow churches to make 
these decisions without fear of retaliatory government action in the 
form of de facto taxation. Anything other than complete autonomy 
over these core church decisions would invite unnecessary and po-
tentially unlawful entanglement by the state.406 
2. Polygamy 
Applying the above approach in the polygamy context renders a 
similar analysis but with notable distinctions. Unlike with same-sex 
marriage, in which the (assumed) fundamental public policy is in 
favor of same-sex marriage, the (IRS-assumed) fundamental public 
policy with regard to polygamy is strict opposition. This inverts the 
complications that arise in the same-sex marriage context. For one, 
instead of compelling churches to perform same-sex marriages by 
threatening revocation of tax benefits, the state, on the same threat-
ened tax benefit revocation grounds, would prohibit a church from 
performing polygamous marriages. But do these distinctions make 
a difference? It is hard to find a principled reason that they should. 
For churches that oppose same-sex marriage as a matter of reli-
gious doctrine, that doctrine is informed by views about human 
sexuality and what constitutes "marriage."407 Both prongs that form 
the basis of such doctrine are based on "religious" assumptions. For 
churches that endorse polygamy, the basis of that belief rests on 
different doctrinal assumptions than those that oppose the practice, 
but churches that support polygamy nonetheless approach ques-
tions of sexuality and marriage in a religious manner.408 Since de-
fining what constitutes "marriage" is religious, at least when de-
fined by a church, the state has no authority to distinguish among 
406. But see infra Part V.C. (limitations). 
407. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 'l[ 1601 (2016) ("The matrimonial 
covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of 
the whole of life, is by its nature ordered toward the good of the spouses and the pro-
creation and education of offspring .... "). 
408. See, e.g., Plural Marriage and Families in Early Utah, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/topics/plural-marriage-
and-families-in-early-utah?lang--eng [https://perma.cc/SCZ9-UYRN]. 
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and favor churches whose definitions of marriage comport with the 
state's preferred definition. Doing so would have the state exceed 
its sphere of authority by encroaching upon churches' sovereign 
spheres. Moreover, if the state could do so, then churches that op-
pose same-sex marriage would have no argument for retaining 
their autonomy, given their refusal to perform same-sex weddings. 
The state could simply reject the autonomy of such churches, com-
pel compliance with the fundamental public policy, which is in fa-
vor of same-sex marriage, and force such churches to either lose 
their tax benefits or perform same-sex marriages. Assuming, then, 
that a church holds a sincere religious belief that endorses the prac-
tice of polygamy, the state-pursuant to the principle of noninter-
ference and in respecting church autonomy-cannot interfere with 
that practice by revoking such a church's tax benefits. 
But the state's noninterference need not extend so far as to en-
dorse polygamy itself. In other words, just as the state cannot coerce 
a church into halting the performance of polygamous marriages, 
neither can a church that supports polygamy coerce the state into 
endorsing polygamous marriages. Thus, while the state cannot stop 
a church from performing a polygamous marriage, it does not have 
to legally recognize such marriages.409 The state need not contradict 
its own fundamental public policy-which ( assuming arguendo) de-
fines marriage as a union between two, and only two, consenting 
adults-by endorsing polygamous unions. Each institution is only 
sovereign, and thus autonomous, within its own sphere. That ap-
plies equally to churches as well to the state. In light of the view 
advanced in this Article, the state could not prohibit a church from 
performing a polygamous marriage within a religious context, but 
the state would not have to validate that union and act contrary to 
fundamental public policy by issuing marriage licenses that en-
dorse polygamy. And if the practices of the church led to violation 
409. But see Renuka Santhanagopalan, Note, Menage ii What? The Fundamental Right 
to Plural Marriage, 24 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 415, 421-35 (2018) 
(arguing that the fundamental right to marry recognized in Obergefell constitutionally 
extends to polygamous marriages); Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The 
Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 2044 (2015) (same). 
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of state criminal statutes prohibiting bigamy, as the IRS found was 
the case with a church that promoted polygamy,410 then denial of 
tax-exempt status would be justified for the reasons detailed in the 
next Part. 
C. Limitations 
This approach has several limitations. First, as mentioned earlier 
it should only apply to the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy 
doctrine and not the related but distinct illegality doctrine, because 
in our current legal system churches and their leaders are not fully 
separate and equal sovereigns who are above the law ( or more ac-
curately, not subject to the government's laws). Rather, the soft sov-
ereignty approach, while recognizing church autonomy, is cogni-
zant of the fact that churches are one of many societal spheres-the 
state as sphere of spheres chief among them. If churches were above 
the law, we would be in a world where the hard sovereignty ap-
proach to the application of tax and other laws to churches was still 
in place. The protections of the First Amendment do not go that far. 
Therefore, if a church is found by the appropriate authority to 
have engaged in illegal behavior as a significant part of its activities, 
including with respect to sex discrimination or immigration laws, 
that would justify the loss of the tax benefits that churches other-
wise enjoy. An extreme example of such a situation would be a 
church that engages in human sacrifice-that is, murder-but more 
realistic examples also exist, such as the church that was found to 
have engaged in the distribution of marijuana.411 Of course, in this 
situation the church and its leaders likely will be more concerned 
about the direct sanctions associated with that illegal behavior than 
the indirect tax consequences, as noted previously. 
Second, and relatedly, there is the issue of whether the illegal be-
havior should be limited to criminal illegality or also extend to vio-
lations of civil laws. Given the breadth of civil laws at both the fed-
eral and state levels and the triviality of the activities they penalize 
410. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
411. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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in many instances, we believe only criminal activities should be 
able to form the basis for revocation of tax-exempt status for a 
church under the Bob Jones University decision. This appears to be 
the approach the IRS has usually taken, including with respect to 
applying the illegality doctrine to churches.412 
Finally, for the reasons stated previously, this Article has ac-
cepted Bob Jones University as a given, and so has not questioned the 
Court's holding in the case that the First Amendment does not 
shield non-church religious organizations from the contrary-to-
fundamental-public-policy doctrine. In addition, we have noted 
that when non-church religious organizations provided secular ser-
vices or goods in a manner that is contrary to fundamental public 
policy, the government has a stronger interest in denying them tax 
benefits than it does in the case of a typical church, although some 
commentators would reject this distinction.413 Accepting this limi-
tation, if a church is engaged in secular education, health care, or 
similar activities the contrary-to-fundamental-public-policy doc-
trine would still apply. The previously discussed IRS decision to 
revoke the tax-exempt status of a legal entity that housed both a 
traditional church and a racially discriminatory school was there-
fore correct, especially since the church could avoid the loss of tax 
benefits by moving the school into a separate (taxable) legal en-
tity.414 
CONCLUSION 
While rarely invoked, Bob Jones University remains good law and 
so provides a potential basis for revoking the tax benefits normally 
412. See supra Part LB. 
413. See supra note 367 and accompanying text (supporting this distinction); Robert 
M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 66 (1983) (rejecting this 
distinction). 
414. Indeed, this is the strategy that Bob Jones University used to obtain tax-exempt 
status under Section 501(c)(3) for its art museum. See Bob Jones Univ. Museum & Art 
Gallery v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3120 (1996); Victoria B. Bjorklund, Spinoffs: Bob 
Jones University Museum and Beyond: Evolving Techniques for Use of For-Profit Subsidiaries, 
Asset Protection, and Other Multiple-Entity Structures, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Dec. 
5, 1996. 
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enjoyed by certain nonprofit organizations, as highlighted by the 
exchange during the Obergefell oral argument. Moreover, there are 
both current and foreseeable conflicts between the activities of 
some churches and likely fundamental public policies. Yet while 
the IRS has indicated it views the decision as fully applying to 
churches, the Supreme Court has never so held. Based on 
longstanding philosophical views of how churches and the state 
should interact and a more recent theory regarding how the First 
Amendment should govern such interactions, we conclude that Bob 
Jones University should not apply with full force to churches. In-
stead, it should apply only if a church violates the illegality doctrine 
by engaging in significant criminal activities. But if instead a 
church's activities are only contrary to fundamental public policy, 
then the state should recognize a church's autonomy or soft sover-
eignty by providing the church with the tax benefits to which it is 
entitled. 
